The Purpose of Child Support by Ellman, Ira M
1. Ira Mark Ellman is Willard Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar and Professor of Law at the Sandra Day
O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State. Tara Ellman is an economic consultant in Tempe, Arizona. Much of the work
on this paper was completed while Professor Ellman was Visiting Scholar at the School of Social Welfare, University
of California, Berkeley, and he wishes to express his appreciation for the school’s hospitality. The authors benefitted
from discussions of this paper at the Faculty Workshop of the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State
University, and at the Spring 2006 meeting of the Child and Youth Policy Center of the University of California at
Berkeley. Special thanks are due Neil Gilbert for his comments on an earlier draft, and Elizabeth Fella for her able
research assistance.
2. The debate over the content of support rules began in earnest in the 1970's as pressure mounted to do
something about the enforcement of support orders. The battle was engaged once the federal government required all
states to adopt support guidelines, see Part IA of this Article, below. The approach suggested by the consultant to the
HHS advisory committee, described belowas the Williams-Betson model, came under earlyattack from feminist scholars,
many of whom made insightful observations about its problematic policy implications. See, e.g., ESSENTIALS OF CHILD
SUPPORT GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT : ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, Proceedings of the Women's
Legal Defense Fund's National Conference on the Development of Child Support Guidelines, 1986, Queenstown,
Maryland (The Fund, 1987). Many supported what became known as the equal living standard principle, originally
advocated in Judith Cassetty, CHILD SUPPORT AND PUBLIC POLICY: SECURING SUPPORT FROM ABSENT FATHERS
(Lexington Books 1978). A more exhaustive and more recent effort to justify an equal living standard approach is
offered in Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 Cal.
L. Rev. 41 (1998). Despite these efforts of feminists, the Williams-Betson model came to dominate, see Part I of this
article. More recently, it has been attacked by some father’s advocates as unfair to support obligors, see, e.g., R. Mark
Rogers and Donald Bieniewicz, Child Support Guidelines: Underlying Methodologies, Assumptions, and the Impact
on Standards of Living, in William Comanor, editor, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 60
(Edward Elgar, 2004) and Ronald Henry, Child Support Policy and the Unintended Consequences of Good Intentions,
in Comanor, id, at 128, 147-152. Neither side in these debates effectively engages the other, because they begin from
incompatible premises. Feminist scholars seem often to assume that equal living standards is the only just result, while
partisans on the father’s rights side assume that there is some objectively correct measure of a child’s “cost” upon which
support amounts should be based. The first is a value judgment about which sane observers may differ. The second is
simply wrong as a technical matter, see Ellman, Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis Used to Construct Child
Support Guidelines, 2004 University of Chicago Legal Forum 167. Garrison tries valiantly to justify the equal living
standards approach. The fact that no state has knowingly adopted equal living standards suggests it is not compatible with
most people’s instincts as to the fair result. Neither side in the debate grapples effectively with the reality that child and
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What is the appropriate amount of child support to require in particular cases? How should
we take account, if at all, of subsequent events such as either parent’s remarriage? It seems obvious
that the answers to such questions ought to turn on our purpose in requiring support payments in the
first place. But while fixing the amount of child support can be politically contentious, and has
attracted the attention of partisans on both sides of the gender gap,2 the literature contains no
custodial parent share a common household: Father’s advocates object to the custodial parent deriving any benefit from
child support, despite the fact that this is unavoidable, while feminist scholars often do not acknowledge any need to take
account of such “hidden alimony” (as father’s groups label it) in child support payments. The American Law Institute
proposal, Chapter 3 in the PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (2002), was a major step forward from this
morass, and this Article draws and builds upon it.
3. Paul Legler, Low-Income Fathers and Child Support: Starting Off on the Right Track, Annie E. Casey
Foundation 6 (2003) (finding that child support collections increased from $8 billion in 1992 to $18 billion in 2000).
Among children living in families whose incomes fell below the federal poverty threshold, 30.8% received child support
in 1996; this number increased to 35.5% in 2001. Similarly, the percentage of children receiving child support who lived
in families with incomes at or up to 200 percent of the poverty threshold increased from 44.6% in 1996 to 50.1% in 2001.
Elaine Sorensen, Child Support Gains Some Ground, The Urban Institute, 3 Snapshots of America’s Families 11, 1
(2003), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310860_snapshots3_no11.pdf. These numbers are encouraging,
given an apparent decrease in child support collection in the 1980's. Thomas Hanson, Irwin Garfinkel, Sara McClanahan,
and Cynthia Miller, Trends in Child Support Outcomes, 33 Demography 483-496 (1996). Hanson, et. al, concluded that
this downward trend was at partially attributable to an increase in the proportion of never-married mothers in the 1980's.
In 1999, 39.8% of never-married mothers had a child support order, compared with 57.9% of divorced or separated
mothers, and 63.6% of currently married mothers. Elaine Sorensen & Helen Oliver, Child Support Reforms in PRWORA:
Initial Impacts, The Urban Institute, 16-17 (2002). However, an increasing number of orders are being entered against
nonmarital fathers. Between 1992 and 2000, the number of cases in which paternity is established each year increased
from 500,000 to 1.5 million. Low-Income Fathers and Child Support, at 6. New federal rules requiring states to attempt
to establish the paternity of children born to unmarried mothers before they leave the hospital has been effective, see
Ronald Mincy, Irwin Garfinkel and Lenna Nepomnyaschay, In-Hospital Paternity Establishment and Father-
Involvement in Fragile Families, 67 J. Marriage and the Family 611 (2005). But see Nat'l Women's Law Ctr. & Ctr. on
Fathers, Families, & Pub. Policy, Family Ties: Improving Paternity Establishment Practices and Procedures for
Low-Income Mothers, Fathers and Children, 7 (2000) (finding that establishment of paternity does not always lead to
child support orders).
4. Ellman, Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis Used to Construct Child Support Guidelines, 2004
University of Chicago Legal Forum 167.
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systematic examination of support rules in light of their underlying policy purpose. This article fills
that gap. It shows that the federally-required guidelines that determine most support orders generally
conflict with the policies they are meant to further, explains how this conflict is the unintended but
inevitable consequence of the methods most states rely upon for constructing their guidelines, and
offers a new method for setting support guidelines that would ensure they reflect the policymakers’
purpose. This topic was not very imporant when compliance with child support orders was rare. Our
increasing success in establishing and enforcing support orders3 now requires, however, that we pay
more attention to their content.
In an earlier article one of us examined in detail the conventional method employed by
consultants that states usually rely upon to draft their support guidelines, and showed why it is
unlikely to yield support amounts that follow from any policy choice the relevant state authorities
might imagine they have made.4 Part I of this article capsules and extends that prior analysis. Part
II asks the fundamental question that current methodologies never consider: what in fact are the
policy purposes we mean to further by requiring child support payments? Part III explains how states
can write guidelines that implement their particular policy choices far more reliably than they can
using current methods.
5. See Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Award Cases: An Empirical Study of Establishment and
Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver District Court, 57 DEN. L.J. 21, 38-42 (1979); White & Stone, A
Study of Alimony and Child Support Rulings with Some Recommendations, 10 FAM. L.Q. 75, 83 (1976).
6. Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child Custody,
Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 473, 494-501 (1979); Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy:
The Systematic Imposition of Costs on Women, 6 Harv. Women’s L.J. 1 (1983).
7. Pub. L. 100-485, 42 U.S.C. § 667(b) (2001).
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I. Current Practice
A. Background
At one time child support orders were determined case by case. Trial judges exercised
discretion under statutes that left them largely free to set the award for the dollar amount they
thought appropriate. Not surprisingly, the result was wide variation in the amount of child support
ordered among cases whose essential facts seemed quite similar.5 The few applicable legal principles
were largely hortatory. It was often said the law required support amounts based upon the standard
of living maintained in the intact family, but that principle was illusory. The greater expense of
maintaining two post-divorce households typically requires that at least one of them experience a
living standard decline, which means the real question is the proper allocation of this shortfall. Trial
judges necessarily answered that question implicitly as they set support levels in individual cases,
but they rarely had to explain their choice. That is why the governing rules could seem to vary
between cases. Some commentators argued that orders were often too low to meet a child's minimum
needs, much less maintain the prior standard of living.6 Even if this were not true, the burden of
making out a case for support was itself an important barrier to establishing an order, and thus to
enforcement of the support obligation.
Reforming this discretionary system thus became part of the federal effort in the 1980's to
improve the collection of child support. Congress conditioned federal funding for each state’s
welfare program on the state’s creation of child support guidelines. Under rules still in effect, the
Family Support Act of 1988 required that these guidelines establish, in every case, a dollar figure
that is presumed by law to be the correct amount of child support. States must bind their courts to
set the support order for this presumed amount, unless the judge writes an opinion to explain why
that amount was inappropriate in the particular case in question.7
Although federal law requires child support guidelines, it leaves states free to fashion them
as they wish. One’s first thought might be to base the guidelines on the cost of children, but that
can’t work. A rule that guidelines should cover the children’s “cost” would tell us nothing, because
one cannot measure what children cost without first deciding what living standard to buy for them.
That choice of living standard is a value judgment the guideline writer must make. It is a difficult
judgment because the child and the custodial parent share the same living standard when they share
8. Calif.Fam.Code § 3900.
9. Another approach is to offer inconsistent statements that suggest different resolutions of this tradeoff. See,
e.g., descriptions of the purpose of New York’s child support law as contained in three different official documents
described in Ellman, Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis Used to Construct Child Support Guidelines, 2004
University of Chicago Legal Forum 167, 179-180. As explained id., the three descriptions are mutually inconsistent, and
only one of them could possibly be interpreted in a manner consistent with New York’s actual guidelines.
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a home. The custodial parent cannot be expected to eat noodles while feeding the child steak. And
unless the two parents have infinite resources, the higher the living standard enjoyed by the custodial
household, the lower the living standard enjoyed by the support obligor. Further, both obligor and
custodial parent may live with a new spouse and new children who will also share the living standard
consequences of any support payment. Child support awards inevitably transfer resources from all
members of the obligor’s household, to all members of the custodial parent’s household, including
the custodial parent herself. Formally, however, the law ignores this reality. It pretends that dollars
are true to their label, that child support dollars benefit only the obligor’s children, and alimony
dollars benefit only the parent. A sensible analysis of child support policy requires abandoning that
pretense. Much of this essay therefore discusses the relative situations of the custodial and
noncustodial households, rather than the relative situations of the individuals within them, on the
assumption that the members of a family who live together share a common living standard. Indeed,
one might argue that shared financial status is one characteristic that defines the difference between
a family household and a group of housemates.
Comparing the living standards of the two parental households is complicated by the fact that
increasing proportions of separated parents live with a new spouse or partner, as well as additional
children who are not the children of their former partner. These additional adults and children share
the living standard impact of a child support award that is normally calculated without consideration
of their presence, even though it adds or subtracts income from what is now their family unit. Just
as significantly, the additional adults often have income that contributes to the well-being of other
members of their new household. For example, the income of a custodial mother’s new husband will
almost always improve his stepchild’s living standard, and the income of the support obligor’s new
spouse may improve to the obligor’s living standard, and thus the obligor’s capacity to pay support.
Existing law usually ignores these realities as well. For now we will also ignore the complications
of new household members, but will return to them in the final section of this essay.
What principles do current state guidelines reflect? One can’t tell from the aspirational
statements contained in the typical state statutes or regulations because most are so vague as to be
contentless. California, for example, specifies that the parents should support their child “in a
manner suitable to the child’s circumstances”.8 Such vacuity avoids the politically contentiousness
that might arise from any effort to set forth a clear statement that recognized and resolved the need
to decide upon the appropriate tradeoff in the financial well-being of the relevant parties.9 A
disinclination to confront the inevitable tradeoffs was facilitated by two studies the Department of
Health and Human Services funded in the late 1980's. Meant to assist states in complying with the
forthcoming guideline requirements, the studies focused on estimating how much parents in intact
10. Robert Williams, Development of Guidelines for Child Support Orders: Advisory Panel Recommendations
and Final Report, p II-ii, in U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Child Support Enforcement
(1987). This report was formally issued by an Advisory Panel assembled by the National Center for State Courts, but
was funded by the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement.
11. This second report, by David Betson, was prepared under a contract with the University of Wisconsin’s
Institute for Research on Poverty for a final report to H.H.S., Alternative Estimates of the Cost of Children from the
1980-86 Consumer Expenditure Survey, Institute for Research on Poverty Special Report # 51, 1990. Even though the
title, as well as the text, refer to the cost of children, the report describes itself as a response to a provision in § 128 of
the Family Support Act of 1988 (PL 100-485) that required H.H.S. to “detail the patterns of expenditures on children
in two-parent families and single-parent families.” Id at 1 (emphasis added). And indeed, the methodology employed
in fact purports to estimate those expenditures.
12. Williams founded a consulting company (Policy Studies Inc., or PSI) as the guideline era began, and that
company now prepares the guideline grid in the majority of states. Early on PSI signed up Betson to provide the
expenditure calculations that it uses. Even states that do not use PSI often use its methods.
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families spend on their children, as a substitute for estimating how much children “cost”. The first
(the Williams study), recognizing that “there is no absolute standard for the ‘cost’ of rearing a child”,
concluded that “economic studies are able to infer the ‘cost’ . . . at a given income level only by
observing the actual expenditures allocated to a child in existing households.”10 The second (the
Betson study) simply conflated the concepts of cost and expenditure. While offering a method for
estimating expenditures on children in intact families, by parental income and family size, the
study’s title and text both refer repeatedly to the costs of children, as if costs and expenditures were
the same.11 Of course they are not. But as the quote from Williams suggests, the shift from cost to
expenditure (Williams endorsed Betson’s method) avoids the need to make value judgments about
the appropriate living standard, judgments that would be necessary if one sought to estimate costs.
It seems to get the guideline writer off the policy hook, because this methods sets the guideline
amounts by reference to the consultant’s estimate of the average spending behavior of parents in
intact families, not by the policy judgments of the guideline writers. Essential to the illusion that this
method is policy-neutral is the assumption that the task of estimating parental expenditures on
children is a pure technical exercise requiring no policy choices.
Perhaps at least in part because of the appeal of a “value-neutral” methodology, the Williams-
Betson method is employed by the great majority of states, and I refer to it here as the conventional
methodology.12 Yet once one pierces the method, it becomes clear that value judgments are not
avoided by it, they are simply hidden from view. One cannot tally what parents spend on their
children without first deciding what counts as a child expenditure. More than arithmetic is involved.
If a couple spends the same amount on rent after having a child, as they did when childless, does that
mean that none of their rental expenditure counts as an expenditure on their child? What if they
move to a different rental unit, perhaps in a different location, even though for the same price? How
much of the family’s utility bill is an expenditure on children? Different answers to such questions
will yield different expenditure estimates, with a corresponding effect on anysupport guideline based
upon them. There are in fact competing methods for estimating expenditures on children that yield
different results because they assume, implicitly or explicitly, different answers to questions like
13. This example is not fanciful. The marginal expenditure methodology employed in the Williams-Betson
approach is in fact likely to lead to an estimate of expenditures on children that includes nothing, or next to nothing, for
utilities, without regard to whether the custodial parent has other funds with which to pay utility bills. That is because
the addition of a child to an intact household previously consisting of two adults may not increase utility bills by very
much, if at all, and it is only such increases, not the base costs, which count as marginal expenditures on children.
Similarly, for example, with costs for automobiles, and for the largest proportion of housing costs (since, e.g., only the
additional cost of the two-bedroom apartment, over the one bedroom, would count as a marginal expenditure, with all
the cost of the base apartment excluded).
14. Ellman, Fudging Failure, supra.
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these.
So the conventional method requires preliminary judgments about what counts as a child
expenditure–and thus, what expenditures are included in the tally that forms the basis of the support
guidelines. If expenditures on gas, electricity, telephones or a car are not counted as a child
expenditure, then their cost will not be reflected in the support payment specified in the resulting
guideline.13 The “income shares” guidelines that most states employ uses the conventional method
for estimating total child expenditures, and then allocates responsibility for those expenditures
between the two parents in proportion to their incomes. The noncustodial parent pays his share to
the custodial parent as the support order. But of course, items that are not counted as child
expenditures are not part of the estimate and are thus not allocated. In that case, the custodial parent
needs other income to pay for these items. What if the custodial parent does not have much other
income? Does that concern mean we should count utilities as a child expenditures? Or should we
say the utility bill is the custodial parent’s responsibility since it is not much affected by the child’s
presence in the household? Or should we make an adjustment depending on the parent’s relative
incomes? How we resolve this is a question of child support policy, not cost accounting. Equivalent
questions can be repeated with most other expenditure categories, and the answers will determine
the shape of the support guideline grid. But the child support policy choice implicit in these
expenditure classifications are typically inaccessible to the state officials charged with formulating
support guidelines, who usually have neither the skills nor the inclination to pierce the cloud of
technical jargon to reveal them. The result is that policy decisions are not avoided by the shift in
focus from cost to expenditure, they are just made opaque, often hidden from the view of the
policymakers themselves. But they are there.
B. Support Levels Called for Under Current Guidelines
I have previously examined the conventional method in great detail,14 and only summarize
it here. The conventional method tries to measure the additional expenditures a childless couple must
make in order to retain their same living standard after children are added to their household. It
assumes that these additional expenditures–marginal expenditures in economists’ language–are the
correct measure of expenditures on children for the purpose of setting the dollar amount of child
support orders. Prior work identifies many technical problems with the usual implementation of this
marginal expenditure measure, but for now I ignore them in favor of focusing on the more
15. Arizona normally reduces the support award to reflect the time spent with the support obligor under the
visitation schedule. See Paragraph 11 of the Guidelines, at page 10. (The Arizona guidelines, set out in an order of the
Arizona Supreme Court, may be found at <http://www.supreme.state.az.us/dr/childsup/CSG2004.pdf>. ) The Table 1
figures do not include a visitation adjustment. Were it included, the support amounts reflected in this table would be
lower. For example, were the support obligor to see the child between 88 and 115 days each year–a range that
encompasses most cases–the guidelines would reduce the support amount for Case 1 by $53, the amount for Case 2 by
$106, and the amount for Case 3 by $148. On the other hand, the guidelines allow the court to increase the child support
award to reflect the obligor’s proportionate share of child care costs “appropriate to the parents' financial abilities”, and
require an increase to reflect the obligor’s share of the cost of health insurance. See the guidelines at Paragraph 9, pages
6-7.
16. The poverty threshold is set by determining the cost of the breadbasket necessary to provide a family of the
specified size with a basic but nutritionally adequate diet. That amount is then multiplied by a standard constant,
originally set at 3, to get an the total household income required to maintain a family of that size above the poverty level.
See Gordon M. Fisher, The Development and History of the Poverty Thresholds, 55 Social Security Bulletin No. 4,
Winter 1992, pp. 3-14. This very simple calculation has its critics, see Constance F. Citro and Robert T. Michael
(editors), MEASURINGPOVERTY: ANEWAPPROACH (National Academy Press, 1995). There is no doubt that it is an inapt
device for comparing the living standards of households in the upper half of the income distribution. It is nonetheless
a standard measure that is easy to understand and provides a useful, if imperfect, way to compare the living standards
of households, especially those in the lower end of the income distribution. For more on this general topic, see the
sources collected by Health and Human Services at <http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/contacts.shtml#f> , as well as Kathleen
Short, Experimental Poverty Measures, 1999 (October 2001), Current Population Reports P60-216, U.S. Census Bureau.
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fundamental question: are married couples’ marginal expenditures on their children living with them
the appropriate benchmark to employ in setting the dollar amount we will require a noncustodial
parent to pay the custodial parent in child support ? One way to begin answering this question is to
look at the child support amounts that this method yields in selected cases. Consider Table One,
which sets out examples of three cases, all involving a custodial parent (CP) who lives with the
couple’s one child and earns $1000 monthly. The cases differ only in the income earned by the
noncustodial parent (NCP), who lives alone, and earns either $500 monthly (Case 1), $2500 (Case
2), or $6000 (Case 3). The table shows the support payments called for in each case under the child
support schedule currently in effect in Arizona.15 Similar calculations for the guidelines of other
selected states is set forth in the Appendix. Arizona is an income shares state with guidelines based
on the conventional methodology, and it revised its guidelines in 2004. The required payment is
shown both in dollars, and as a percent of the noncustodial parent’s income. Finally, the last two
columns of the table show the incomes of the custodial and noncustodial households, after the
support payment is made, as a percent of the federal government’s Poverty Threshold for a
household of that composition.16 For ease of exposition, we refer to the custodial parent in these
examples as the mother, and the noncustodial parent as the father, which conforms to the actual facts
in the great majority of such cases.
17. Paragraph 15 of the 2004 Arizona Child Support Guidelines, at page 14, directs the court to subtract the
self-support reserve of $775 from the obligor’s monthly income. Whenever the remainder, called the “resulting amount”
in the guidelines, is less than the support order called for in the guidelines, the court is authorized (but not required) to
reduce the order to this “resulting amount”. In Case 1 the resulting amount is a negative number, which means the court
would be authorized to reduce the order to zero. The guidelines allow the court discretion in these cases, observing that
under such facts it is “evident that both parents have insufficient income to be self-supporting.” The Arizona guidelines
may be accessed at <http://www.supreme.state.az.us/dr/childsup/CSG2004.pdf>.
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Table 1
Low-Income Custodial Parent in Three Situations
(CP Earns $1000 Monthly, Lives with One Child)
Case
Number
NCP
Income
(Before
Support
Payment)
Support
Payment
(Under
Arizona
Guideline)
Payment As
% NCP
Income
CP Income,
After
Payment, As
% Poverty
NCP
Income,
After Pmt,
As %
Poverty
1 $ 500 $110 22 % 107 % 50 %
2 $ 2500 $471 19 % 142 % 260 %
3 $ 6000 $781 13 % 173 % 668 %
Note: All income figures are gross incomes (before tax calculations); poverty threshold
calculations based on 2002 data.
Case 1 is the all-too-common problem in which both parents are poor, the father earning even
less than the mother. Their combined income of $1500 cannot possibly support two households
above the poverty line, and in fact it does not. The fifth column shows that after the child support
payment of $110, the child’s household income barely exceeds the official federal estimate of the
amount a household of this composition requires to avoid poverty, their after-transfer income of
$1110 being equal to 107% of that poverty threshold. The child’s household is thus in relatively
desperate straits. The father is even worse off, however, as the $390 left after the support payment
leaves him with an income that is half the poverty threshold for a single individual. In fact, Arizona
would probably excuse this father from making more than a nominal support payment. Like most
states, the Arizona guidelines provide for a “self-support reserve”. The details of these provisions
vary among the states, but their general purpose is to shield obligors from support orders that would
impoverish them. In Arizona, the trial court is authorized to reduce the support payment to zero if
the obligor has less than $775 in monthly gross income.17 This father qualifies for that reduction,
which is left to the court’s discretion.
Of course, if the court orders no support, then the child’s household will also fall below the
poverty threshold of $1037. The Arizona guidelines rightly observe that in such cases it is “evident
that both parents have insufficient income to be self-supporting.” It is also evident that the
guidelines’ allocation of this shortfall is not based exclusively on the child’s well-being. There is
18. The first author served in 2004 on the Arizona committee responsible for conducting its quadrennial
guideline review. The consultant’s report, described in detail in Fudging Failure, supra, never raised this balancing
question, It was discussed by the committee only because it was raised by the author, and had not been considered by
prior committees.
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another principle also operating here, which we can call the Earner’s Priority Principle (EPP). It is
the simple idea that everyone, including parents, ordinarily has first call on their own income. That
priority is not absolute–or else no support could ever be ordered–but it appears to have special force
in the case of the poor obligor. That is at least the apparent message of the self-support reserve. We
will return to this observation later when we consider the EPP in more detail. For now the self-
support reserve provides an early example of the trade-offs in child well-being and fairness that must
take place in setting child support amounts.
In Case 1 the child support system is arguably unimportant. If neither party has much money,
the child’s well-being depends upon finding a third source of funds, whether a new spouse, private
charity, or a public income support system. Moving money around among desperately poor parties
cannot contribute much to social welfare. For our purposes, therefore, Cases 2 and 3 are more
interesting. While the mother’s income is no different in these cases, the father has much more
money and can therefore pay amounts that would make an impact on child well-being. Yet the
current child support schedule may do less for the custodial household in Cases 2 and 3 than one
might expect. In Case 2 the larger support payment lifts the living standard of the custodial
household from 107% of the poverty threshold to 142%. Yet the father’s situation improves much
more, from half the poverty level to more than 2 ½ times. The father is hardly rich, but he has some
degree of financial security, especially as compared to the child, who is still in a financially
precarious state. It seems the child in Case 2 could benefit substantially from a larger support
payment, and the father is capable of providing that.
Case 3 makes the same point more dramatically. This father is earning 12 times the amount
earned by the father in Case 1–a solidly middle class income that leaves a single individual
comfortably circumstanced. But the relatively modest increase in his child support payment still
leaves the child’s household at less than twice the poverty threshold. The father, by contrast, has
nearly seven times the poverty threshold after making the support payment, and thus enjoys a leap
in his financial well-being, as compared to Case 1. It seems unlikely the Earner’s Priority Principle
can justify this large disparity between the child’s living standard and the father’s, nor does it seem
likely this disparity would seem appropriate to most people asked to balance the interests of the child
and each of the parents. Because the method employed to generate these support amounts (described
below in Part I(C)) does not usually present this balancing question, the state officials charged with
adopting the guidelines are unlikely to address it.18 The operating assumption of the current system,
in Arizona as in most states, is that a guideline grid based upon the consultant’s estimates of child
expenditures yields generally appropriate support payments without the need to ask such questions.
Table 1 shows that this operating assumption is probably not correct. In fact, the surprising results
shown in Table 1 are inevitable under the conventional methodology employed for estimating child
expenditures to generate support guidelines, not only in Arizona but in most states. The next section
19. Determining when households of different composition have the same living standard is fraught with
difficulties, but we do not examine them here. For a full treatment of this problem, see Ellman, Fudging Failure: The
Economic Analysis Used to Construct Child Support Guidelines, 2004 University of Chicago Legal Forum 167
20. There are many methodological choices that must be made in generating estimates of marginal expenditures,
and different choices lead to very different estimates. But not only are there competing methods for estimating marginal
expenditures, it is far from obvious that marginal expenditures are the appropriate benchmark anyway, and there are
alternatives to marginal expenditure estimates. The most well-known alternative is the annual report by Mark Lino,
Expenditures on Children by Families: 2001 Annual Report, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Center for Nutrition Policy
and Promotion, Miscellaneous Publication No. 1528-2001 (2002). (For a published version of the prior year’s equivalent
study, see Mark Lino, Expenditures on children by families: U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates and Alternative
Estimators, 11 J Legal Econ 31, 31 (2001).) Lino argues that the Agriculture Department’s approach is a better basis for
support guidelines than alternative approaches using a marginal expenditure methodology. Id. at 35. While the debate
among marginal expenditure methodologies is usually cast in technical terms, it is in fact a policy debate, as is also the
choice between marginal expenditures and other methods such as Lino’s. For a more complete description of the
technical issues involved, and their policy implications, see Ellman, Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis Used
to Construct Child Support Guidelines, 2004 University of Chicago Legal Forum 167.
21. Ellman, Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis Used to Construct Child Support Guidelines, 2004
University of Chicago Legal Forum 167.
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explains why.
C. Why Current Methods Yield These Results
As noted earlier, the conventional method assumes that support guidelines should be based
upon the expenditures on children in intact families. It measures such expenditures by attempting
to look at childless couple households, at various expenditure levels, and asking how much more an
intact, two-parent household with children must spend for the parents to enjoy the same living
standard as in the childless couple.19 (Expenditure levels are then converted to equivalent income
levels to actually create the guideline grid.) Put another way, the method seeks to estimate the
additional expenditures–marginal expenditures, in economic terms–required to maintain the same
living standard when children are added to the household.20 The assumption that marginal
expenditures are the correct measure of expenditures on children is the main reason for the results
we have just observed. The impact of that assumption is then enlarged by problems in the data upon
which this method must rely.
The data problems are straightforward. The only source of comprehensive data that ties
expenditures to household income is the Consumer Expenditure Survey, which consists largely of
interviews with consumers in which they are asked to recall their expenditures on each item in a list
that the survey designers hope is a comprehensive inventory of all the categories of expenditures that
consumers make. As documented elsewhere,21 these expenditure data systematically undercount
actual consumer expenditures in higher income families–the higher the household income, the higher
proportion of the household’s expenditures erroneouslyomitted from the expenditure tabulation. The
conventional method effectively translates this CES undercount into an undercount of expenditures
on children, so that as household income goes up, the percentage of household income that the
22. Of course, at very high incomes, savings rates will increase, and expenditures as a percent of income will
thus indeed decline. The general trend is therefore not implausible. The CES figures, however, greatly exaggerate this
reality because of the expenditure undercount at higher income levels. The CES figures could only be true if one assumed
savings rates among middle class families that are far higher than anyone believes plausible. See Ellman, id.
23. The discussion that follows is a simplified schematic representation of the methodological points. For a more
detailed and complete description, see Ellman, Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis Used to Construct Child
Support Guidelines, 2004 University of Chicago Legal Forum 167.
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method treats as spent on children declines precipitiously.22 That is one important reason why most
states’ guidelines call for support payments that fall, as a percent of parental income, as the income
rises. In the three cases in Table 1, for example, the support order ranges from 22% of obligor
income, for the lowest income family, to 13%, for the highest income family. Support payments
therefore do not rise proportionately with income–far from it.
But this data problem is only a sub-plot; the conventional method’s focus on marginal
expenditures is the main story.23 To see why, imagine a couple who move to a two bedroom
apartment, from a one-bedroom, when they have a child. Their rent increases from $1000 a month
to $1200. A marginal expenditure analysis would find that the housing expenditure on the child is
the rental difference, or $200. A support guideline based upon a marginal expenditure methodology
will therefore allocate only that $200 between the parents. The method employed to generate most
income share guidelines does not actually examine individual expenditures in this way. Instead, as
explained above, it attempts the gauge the aggregate marginal expenditures on children across all
expenditure categories at once, by asking how much more a two-parent households with children
must spend, as compared to a childless couple, to enjoy the same living standard. The principle,
however, is the same, and the method’s impact is most easily understood if one imagines how it
would work in the context of particular expenditure categories. In the incomes shares model used
by most states, the $200 marginal housing expenditure in this example would be allocated between
the parents in proportion to their incomes. So if Mom, the custodial parent, earns $1000, and Dad,
the noncustodial parent, earns $3000, Dad earns 75% of the parental income and his share of this
marginal housing expenditure is 75% of $200, or $150. He pays this to Mom in child support, as his
share of the child’s $200 housing expenditure.
Yet Mom now has only $1150. She cannot possibly rent an apartment anything like the one
that the couple rented when they were together, because she does not have the base income that
allowed the couple to rent the one bedroom apartment in the first place. The quality of housing
enjoyed by both child and parents, when they were together, relied upon of course relied upon that
base income, as well as the additional amount made necessary by the family’s enlargement. But
while the child necessarily benefitted from all the family’s housing expenditures, this method
allocates only the marginal expenditure of $200 between the parents. The example shows why a
method for generating guidelines that bases support amounts on marginal child expenditures will
necessarily make the economic welfare of the child after separation dependent primarily on the pre-
support-payment income of the custodial parent. If the custodial parent’s own income is high, and
the base is present, the child’s well-being will not be endangered. If it is low, the child will suffer
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a serious economic decline. The impact of the noncustodial parent’s income on the outcome is, by
comparison, much smaller. The main reason is that the child support system is allocating only
marginal parental expenditures on children.
Table 1 gave us a window into this reality from the figures presented earlier in Table 1. To
appreciate it over a wider range of situations, look at Figure One. Once again, Arizona is used here
as an example. Figure 1 compares ten custodial households consisting of one parent and one child.
It assumes that in all ten cases, the income of the two parents combined is the same, $3550 per
month. That income is 300% of the 2002 poverty threshold for the intact household of two parents
and one child, and approximately the median income for that year of all American households.
While these ten sets of parents all have the same total income, they differ in the proportion of their
income earned by the custodial parent, from zero at the left end of the horozontal axis to 1.0–all of
it–at the right end. The two diagonal lines plot the custodial household income for each of these ten
households, not in dollars but as a percentage of the poverty threshold for a one parent, one child
household. The upper diagonal line plots this percentage for the custodial household income after
receipt of the support payment called for in the Arizona support guidelines, while the lower line plots
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24. The support calculations reflected in Figure 1, as for Table 1, do not reflect likely adjustments for visitation,
child care costs, and health care insurance. See note 15. The likely visitation adjustment for the parental incomes
examined in Figure 1 is $108.
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it for the income before the support payment’s receipt.24
Let us then compare the case in which the custodial mother earns 70% of the total parental
income of $3550–about $2500 a month--with the more typical case in which she earns 30% of the
total parental income, or about $1050 a month. A custodial household with $1050 monthly is barely
above the poverty threshold. Receipt of the child support payment raises it to 150% of poverty
threshold, certainly a help. Now consider the other case, in which Mom earns $2500, or 70% of the
same total parental income. This household is at about 230% of the poverty threshold before
receiving any child support payment, and over 250% after. One can see that the children in our two
sample cases come out very differently after divorce despite the fact that their parents earn the same
total income as one another. This seeming discrepancy is an unavoidable consequence of the
marginal expenditure method. A support guideline that allocates only the marginal expenditures on
children leaves most household expenditures out of the calculation and thus out of the support
payment. And so as Figure One shows, the child’s living standard will depend primarily on the share
of the total parental income earned by the custodial parent.
In the extreme cases, where the custodial mother earns either none or all of the parental
income, the difference is enormous. The child living with a stay-at-home mother–not an entirely
fanciful example with very young children–sees the child’s household living standard decline from
the median, 300% of poverty threshold, when the family was intact, to a catastrophic 70% of poverty
after the separation. At the other extreme, where the custodial parent earns all the $3550 of the
parental income, at the right end of the chart, our two lines converge, because at that point her
household income after the support payment is the same as her income before the payment–the full
$3550 of parental income. At this point the custodial household is better off, economically, than the
pre-separation intact household. This is what one should expect, because the custodial household is
smaller but has the same income as the intact household.
In sum, the conventional method produces support guidelines in which a) children’s
situations depend primarily upon the income of the custodial parent with whom they live, b) children
with low-income custodial parents live poorly, no matter the income of their other parent, and c)
dramatically different living standards for children whose respective sets of parents earn the same
total income, if one lives with a parent who accounts for a small proportion of the total parental
income, and the other lives with the high-earning parent. These outcomes result primarily from two
assumptions that underlie the conventional method used in most states: a) that child support amounts
should be based upon expenditures in intact families, as tracked in the consumer expenditure survey,
and b) that only the family’s marginal expenditures on children count as child expenditures, thus
excluding many household expenditures that in fact confer benefits upon children. Because the
method employed to generate these guidelines does not consider their impact on child well-being,
these results are not surprising. Yet one might have thought child well-being was at least one reason,
25. This despite the fact that the inevitability of such trade-offs was noted by Betson himself in an article he
coauthored early in the guideline era. David Betson, et al, Trade-Offs Implicit in Child-Support Guidelines, 11 J Pol Anal
& Manage 2, 10 (1992).
26. Perhaps surprisingly, given the widespread use of the Williams-Betson methodology, plugging any given
set of family facts into the guidelines of the various states yields a remarkably wide range of outcomes. The variety of
results yielded by various guidelines is easily seen in the reviews prepared periodically by Maureen Pirog and her
coauthors. For a recent example, see Maureen Pirog, Tara Grieshop, and Brooks Elliot, Presumptive State Child Support
Guidelines: A Decade of Experience, 12 Policy Currents No. 1 at 15 (Spring 2003). These differences appear to result
from non-systematic variations in the details of the methodology (as in the choice of equivalence scale used to determine
the incomes at which families of different composition enjoy the same living standard) and varying patches to the
methodology that states employ, reflecting perhaps some intuition that the conventional methods unadorned results do
not seem right.
27. Our rules for identifying persons as parents of a particular child, obligated to support that child, do not
always take biological parenthood as the dispositive criterion for legal parenthood and its accompanying support
obligation. See Ira Ellman, Thinking About Custody and Support in Ambiguous-Father Families, 36 Fam.L.Q. 49 (2002).
The problem is highlighted when one considers that support obligations can result from involuntary parenthood (most
clearly, in the case of a support order for a child conceived as a result of rape, entered against the rape victim), while the
voluntary creation of a child may alone be inadequate to justify a support order where conception took place without sex
(as in the consensual use of sperm for artificial insemination). But these cases, while fascinating, are matters for a
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if not the main reason, we require child support payments. More generally, it seems fair to say that
in most states the current support guidelines do not reflect any systematic policy judgment about the
appropriate and inevitable tradeoffs between child well-being and other goals or constraints of which
the policymaker may wish to take account.25 Each state’s guidelines instead reflect the particular
methodological choices that state’s consultant made to generate the expenditure estimates.26 The
choice is ostensibly made on “neutral” technical grounds, which means the consultant never directly
faces the child support policy questions, nor directs the policymaker’s attention to them.
Policymakers must consider a fundamental shift in the method employed for constructing
support guidelines. The current method looks backward, basing support orders on marginal
expenditures in the intact family that no longer exists–and which never existed in an increasing
proportion of child support cases. It would be better to look forward, assessing the impact of the
support guidelines on both the parents and their children, in the situation in which they find
themselves at the time the support order is made. But that requires a systematic evaluation of the
tradeoffs implicit in any set of guidelines. How would one know when the “right” tradeoff between
the two post-separation households had been achieved? To consider that question we must first
identify our purpose in requiring child support.
II. The Purposes of Child Support
Child support laws reflect the widespread belief that state support of children is appropriate
only if parental support is impossible–what one might call the primacy of the parents’ support
obligation. Exactly why this principle is appropriate may be less clear than some may assume.27
different essay. For a useful review of the arguments that can be offered for the support obligation, see Scott Altman,
A Theory of Child Support, 17 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 173 (2003). For a provocative
examination of the basis of paternal obligation where women retain sole control over the abortion decision, see Sally
Sheldon, Unwilling Fathers and Abortion: Terminating Men’s Child Support Obligations?, 66 Modern L. Rev. 175
(2003).
28. A pilot study, using members of the jury pool in Pima County (Tucson) Arizona, has already been
completed, with promising results that, while tentative and incomplete, seem consistent with the analysis offered here.
This empirical study is being conducted by the author in collaboration with two social psychologists, Professor Sanford
Braver of the Psychology Department at Arizona State University, and Professor Rob MacCoun of the Goldman School
of Public Policy, and the Boalt Hall School of Law, at the University of California at Berkeley.
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Whatever difficulty may exist, however, in justifying or explaining the primacy of the parental
support obligation, there is no doubt that policymakers believe it Yet while this principle may
explain why the law requires support at all, it does not help much in determining its amount. A
systematic approach to setting support levels requires a closer examination of the support order’s
purpose. I suggest that support awards are meant to accomplish three purposes, and that the
appropriate amount of the award depends upon the particular blend of these three purposes
applicable to any particular case. The three purposes are : a) to protect the well-being of the child
who is the order’s intended beneficiary (the well-being component); b) to enforce the social
consensus that both parents have a support obligation, even if the child lives primarily with one
parent (the dual-obligation component), and c) to limit the size of the gap that will otherwise
sometimes arise between the child’s living standard and the higher living standard of the support
obligor (the gross disparity component). I elaborate below on these three components, exploring
their rationales and how each contributes to determining the appropriate size of the total support
award. The gross-disparity component is treated last because it is more contested than the first two.
But claims arising from all three components are also limited by a general idea I call the Earner’s
Priority Principle (EPP). I elaborate further upon the EPP after fleshing out the three basic support
components.
This paper’s goal is not philosophical, but sociological. My claim is that one’s judgment
about the appropriate level of support depends upon how one measures each of these three
components, how one weights them in relation to one another, and how one balances them against
the counter-consideration of the EPP. The purpose is to identify the factors that influence people’s
judgment about when a child support award is fair. This effort is necessarily tentative because the
available social science data are limited. Indeed, a principal conclusion of this essay is that
policymakers need better data on how people think about child support, because the setting of child
support awards involves the kinds of trade-offs among people’s interests that is unavoidably
political in nature. An empirical study to gather such data is currently underway.28
The discussion that follows makes two simplifying assumptions. First, that the custodial
household contains only the custodial parent and the children who are the intended beneficiaries of
the support order, and that the noncustodial parent lives alone in a household of one. This
simplifying assumption is probably wrong in many if not most actual cases, yet it is the implicit
assumption of existing law (which treats additional household members as largely irrelevant to the
support calculation), and we initially take existing law on its own terms. We will later consider how
29. The observations made here summarize the findings in Preethy George and Ira Ellman, A Review of the
Literature on the Relationship Between Income and Child Well-Being, which is set out here as Appendix B.
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the principles we develop in this simplified context apply to claims that the support amount should
be altered to reflect the presence of additional persons in either household. Our second simplifying
assumption is that the child lives primarily with one parent, and that the child’s well-being is
therefore affected primarily by the environment in that custodial household, and is not importantly
affected by the environment in the other parent’s household. This assumption is also wrong in some
cases. While the principles developed here could also be extended to joint custody cases, we defer
that exercise to another day.
A. The Child Well-Being Component
As money is added to a household, does child well-being improve? We cannot offer an
empirical answer to that question without first defining what we mean by child well-being. Physical
health is certainly one component of child well-being, but there are others as well. We might
measure the child’s academic success, by considering school performance, or the child’s scores on
various standardized tests. We might measure a child’s psychological well-being with standardized
tests, or through interviews with the child’s parents, counselors, teachers, or medical personnel. We
might ask the child if he or she is happy. We might take these measures when the child is a toddler,
a primary school student, or an adolescent. If we look at the child as an adolescent, we might want
to add questions to our inquiry: does the child smoke? Abuse alcohol or other drugs? Engage in anti-
social or criminal activity, or self-destructive behavior such as casual sex? Finally, we can decide
that we care only, or primarily, about the long-term impact of money on children, so that our primary
measure of the well-being of children should be their well-being as adults. We could look at
outcomes as adults with many of the measures we consider for them as children, but we can also
consider other measures: how much education did they finally complete? What is their income and
socio-economic status? Have they established, as adults, a stable and satisfying family life?
Not surprisingly, the answer we get depends upon the question we ask: the impact of money
on child well-being varies with the measure of well-being.29 The existing literature suggests that
family income has a positive effect on children’s cognitive outcomes and educational attainment,
and thus their eventual socioeconomic status as adults. There are many studies that find results
consistent with this suggestion, whether they measure children’s scores on various tests of cognitive
functioning, children’s school performance, the years of education they complete by adulthood, and
their income as adults. While the effect is found across many studies, there is variation in the effect
size. The overall impression is that the effect size is smaller than many people would assume, but
not trivial, nor an artifact of inquiry’s design or of chance fluctuation. The effect of income on
children’s psycho-social well-being, in contrast to their cognitive functioning or ultimate
socioeconomic status, is less clear. There is evidence that lower income increases parental stress,
which is associated with parental conflict in two-parent families, which is in turn associated with less
favorable psycho-social outcomes for children. The relevance of such data to single-parent families
is, however, unclear. Finally, consider that any effort to relate income to some aggregate measure
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Figure Two: Household Income and Child Well Being (Illustrative)
of well-being requires weighting the relative importance of these various well-being measures, and
that exercise requires value judgments about which people may disagree. Nonetheless, measuring
the relationship between income and child well-being necessarily requires value judgments as well
as data.
Most methodologicallysophisticated studies examine primarily low-income families that fall
close to the poverty line, and one cannot necessarily extend their findings about income’s effect to
middle or upper class families. In general, however, there is more evidence for a positive impact of
money on children’s well-being when the additional funds are added to low-income families, than
when they are added to families with higher incomes. There is also some evidence that child support
dollars have a greater positive impact on children’s outcomes than dollars from other sources,
although the methodological challenges are particularly great with studies of this kind.
Figure Two offers a schematic representation of relationships that might exist between an
unidentified measure of child well-being, and household income. (For this purpose, we assume that
household income and household expenditures rise and fall together, and therefore use the terms
interchangeably.) The dotted line represents the case in which child well-being is poor at very low
income levels, and remains unchanged until household income reaches a threshold level. Above the
threshold, additional income has a simple linear relationship with child well-being: every additional
30. In Mistry, R., Biesanz, J., Taylor, L., Burchinal, M., & Cox, M., Family income and its relation to preschool
children’s adjustment for families in the NICHD study of early child care, 40 Developmental Psychology 727-745
(2004), the researchers found a relationship between cognitive functioning and household income in children 36 months
old. They also found a relationship between household income and behavior problems, as reported by the mother, that
appeared to result from the impact of income on maternal health and on the mother-child relationship. To compare the
impact of income across households of different size and composition, Misty et al. used a “needs” ratio for each of the
1300 families in their sample by dividing the family’s actual household income by the appropriate poverty threshold for
the family–essentially equivalent to reporting their income as percentage of the poverty threshold. They found the impact
of income on these well-being measures began to decline when household income rose above poverty level, and largely
disappeared for families above 500% of the poverty threshold–about $92,00, for a family of four, in 2002, the year in
which Misty’s data was collected. Median household income that year, for a family of four, was $67,732. For a more
complete survey of the relevant literature, see Appendix B.
31. These numbers, provided by the Census Bureau at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/4person.html, are
used by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program
and are published annually by HHS in the Federal Register.
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dollar of income yields an equivalent increase in child well-being. The solid line represents a
different case in which the relationship above the threshold is not linear. Initial dollars above the
threshold buy larger increases in child well-being than do later dollars. The higher the household
income, the smaller the impact of additional income on child well-being. Data limitations, as well
as the conceptual complications involved in aggregating well-being measures into some overall
index, make it impossible to offer a definitive description of the well-being/income function that
relates specified dollar amounts to aggregate well-being. But the available evidence does suggest
that 1) at least some important aspects of child well-being are affected by income, and 2) the
relationship between income and these aspects of child well-being is better represented by the shape
of the solid line, rather than the dotted line. The data are less helpful in locating Points A and B on
the solid line–the income level at which returns to additional dollars begin to decline (Point A), and
the income level at which returns to additional dollars become small enough to ignore, for policy
purposes (Point B). One study of both cognitive functioning and behavior problems in three-year
olds located Point A at the poverty threshold, and Point B at five times the poverty threshold.30 For
a family of four in 2002, the year in which these data were collected, the poverty threshold was
$18,400, and five times that amount is $92,000. By way of comparison, the median income in the
United States for a family of four in 2002 was $67,732, ranging from $87,000 in New Jersey to
$46,000 in New Mexico.31 Clearly, given the quantity and quality of available data, as well as the
conceptual problem of choosing measures of child well-being and of aggregating them into a single
weighted measure, these numbers are at best suggestions. Nonetheless, child support guidelines are
written and revised somewhere every year, reflecting explicit or implicit judgments about the
importance of money to child well-being. Given that reality, it is probably useful to offer
policymakers information of this kind to supplement the intuitions that would otherwise form the
sole basis for their judgments.
Looking at this data, a policymaker might conclude that if the purpose of child support is to
advance child well-being, then we can justify requiring support that raises the income of a custodial
household whose income would otherwise fall short of a point somewhat above the median family
income, because it seems likely that non-trivial gains in child well-being result from adding income
to custodial households within this range. The data also suggest that payments are especially
32. See note 39.
33. The Institute identifies two main claims of the child that the support system should take acocunt of: (a) a
minimum decent standard of living when the combined income of the parents is sufficient to achieve such result without
impoverishing either parent, and (b) a standard of living not grossly inferior to that of either parent. purposes of American
Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, § 3.04(1).
34. For a collection of writings on this problem that includes leading commentators of various persuasions, see
Jon Elster and John Roember, editors, Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being (Cambridge University Press 1991).
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important to child well-being at lower levels of custodial household income. These conclusions may
seem obvious. Yet what we learned in the Section I tells us that current support guidelines in most
states are inconsistent with them, because they set support payments to low-income custodial
households at levels that leave them well short of maximizing child well-being. Of course, there may
be other relevant principles that explain and justify these results. The principles developed in later
sections will help decide if that is true. This section asks what child support levels should be like if
our only concern was child well-being.
Consider Figure Two again. Let us call Point B in Figure Two the “well-being maximum”–
shorthand for the idea that when the custodial household income reaches this level, the further
advances in child well-being that might be realized from additional dollars are too small to justify
imposing child support obligations. All child support guidelines unavoidably, even if only implicitly,
assume some value for the well-being maximum, because they generally do not require support
payments that continue to rise with income no matter how high the income level.32 The question is
where one should locate this point. Guideline committees, like policymakers generally, must usually
act on imperfect information. For the purpose of this discussion, let us assume our best guess is that
the well-being maximum is reached at about the 75th percentile in family household income. That
means that whenever the custodial household income is below the 75th percentile, child well-being
can offer some justification for requiring support. The power of the justification, however, will
gradually decline as the 75th percentile is approached, so that countervailing policy factors (like the
EPP, as we discuss below) become correspondingly more important. On the other hand, we will see
that the gross disparityand dual-obligation components mayjustifyawards even when the well-being
component does not.
While the well-being component gradually declines in justificatory power as the 75th
percentile is approached, data and intuitions combine to suggest it has compelling importance at
lower levels of custodial household income. Because child well-being falls off particularly steeply
below Point A, the well-being component has its greatest force in this income range. Let us assume
that Point A is located at 150% of the poverty threshold, an income characterized by the American
Law Institute as providing the “minimum decent standard of living.”33 Given that all child support
awards impose tradeoffs between the obligor and obligee households, it is especially important to
distinguish cases in which additional support dollars are very important to child well-being, from
cases in which they are less important. Points A and B in our curve locate these boundaries. It is of
course a tricky business to make interpersonal comparisons of well-being, and surveying the
considerable literature on that question is beyond this essay’s scope.34 So long as families have finite
resources, however, such tradeoffs cannot be avoided in setting support levels.
35. See footnote 16, supra.
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Principle 1 summarizes this discussion of the child well-being component:
Principle 1. Protecting child well-being, an essential purpose of child support, has particular
force when the income of the custodial household would otherwise deny the child a minimum decent
living standard (located at Point A in Figure Two). The impact of additional dollars on child well-
being then declines gradually as custodial household income increases, until additional dollars have
too small an impact on measurable child well-being to be of public policy importance. This upper
income bound, Point B in Figure Two, can be called the well-being maximum. Policymakers cannot
avoid judgments about the location of Points A and B despite their inevitably imperfect knowledge.
Comment: We can assume for discussion purposes that Point A is located at 150% of the
poverty threshold for a family of the size and composition of the custodial household. While a
reasonable working assumption for this discussion, it is hardly inevitable. The key is to locate the
income that a family of a given size would require to provide a child with the necessities without
which the child’s chances in life will be importantly compromised. Whether that is best understood
as a certain percentage of poverty level is certainly debatable, depending, among other things, on
how one defines poverty level, a question of continuing debate.35 Policymakers constructing support
guidelines will need to decide what they believe a child must have to be at Point A, as well as the
cost of that living standard in their local environment. Consultants can assist with the determination
but cannot make it, because the choice of living standard for Point A is necessarily a value judgment
that, among other things, involves deciding upon the best choice in the face of unavoidably imperfect
knowledge. Point B is, if anything, even less well-defined than Point A. At what income level does
a family have sufficient funds so that additional income will not add very much to the child’s
development, well-being and happiness? Some may believe that no matter how much money one
has, more money is always better for the child. Most people, however, probably believe there is an
income level above which more money will add only very limited gains, and that is their Point B.
Once again, consultants can assist with locating Point B but cannot alone make this determination
because value judgments are unavoidable in making use of the limited data that is available on this
question. The working assumption of this paper, for the purposes of discussion, is that Point B lies
above median household income but no higher than the 75th income percentile (for two-parent
families with the same number of children as the custodial household).
B. The Dual-Obligation Component.
A second function of child support laws is to enforce a societal consensus that both parents
have a moral obligation to support their children, even if the child lives primarily with one parent.
The dual-obligation component is one reason why states require support payments to custodial
households whose income already exceeds plausible estimates of the value of the well-being
maximum (Point B on our curve). In such cases the explanation is not the child’s well-being, which
will be ensured whether or not anysupport is paid. The explanation is instead society’s determination
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to make sure the noncustodial parent contributes his fair share to the child’s support. Who is entitled
to receive this contribution? The custodial parent, who would otherwise shoulder all the cost of
providing for the child. The two support components we have thus far considered have different
underlying public policies and protect different private interests. The public policy underlying the
first is to ensure the child’s well-being (the well-being component), and the public policy underlying
the second is enforcement of the support duty (the dual obligation component). The private interest
protected by the well-being component is the child’s, in maximizing his or her cognitive,
psychological, and social development. The private interest protected bydual-obligation component
is the custodial parent’s, in not shouldering an unfairly disproportionate financial burden in order
to provide for the child’s well-being.
If the custodial household is above the well-being maximum before any support payment,
then the support payment consists entirely of the dual-obligation component (unless it also includes
a gross disparity component, considered in the next section). If custodial household income does not
reach the well-being maximum even after the support payment is included, then the entire support
payment consists of the well-being component. Where the custodial household income alone
approaches, but does not reach, the well-being maximum, the support award may consist of both a
well-being component (which is the additional income needed to bring the custodial household up
to the well-being maximum) and a dual-obligation component (consisting of the additional amount
required if the well-being component alone does not cover the noncustodial parent’s fair share of the
custodial parent’s expenditures on the child, a result one gets if the increment above the custodial
parent’s income necessary to reach Point B is smaller than the noncustodial parent’s fair share of the
custodial parent’s expenditures to reach Point B.
The dual-obligation component of a child support award is important not only because we
believe both parents must contribute to the child’s support. It may also be essential to maintaining
the noncustodial parent’s social status as parent. Certainly, excusing the noncustodial parent from
any support obligation might cast doubt on his legitimacy as a parent. But neither this concern with
parental legitimacy, nor the determination to require both parents to provide support, helps identify
the appropriate amount of the dual-obligation component. Even nominal awards may be sufficient
to satisfy both concerns. The dual-obligation principle therefore provides a less compelling
justification for any particular amount of support than is provided by the well-being principle. That
means it may yield to counter-considerations more easily than would the well-being component, at
least insofar as the amount of support required to vindicate it. This point is explored more fully
below when we consider the principal counter-consideration, the EPP. But some immediate
discussion of how to calculate the dual-obligation component is necessary to give it more substance.
The dual-obligation component should ensure that the noncustodial parent pays his fair share
of expenditures incurred by the custodial parent, up to the point at which the custodial household
reaches the well-being maximum (Point B). The wealthy custodial parent may spend beyond the
well-being maximum, but the other parent has no obligation to share the cost of that excess. The
location of Point B is thus the first value required to calculate the dual-obligation component.
36. The conventional method, of course, looks at marginal expenditures in the mythical intact that does not exist
at the time of the support order. The argument here suggests looking at the marginal expenditures the custodial parent
will incur on the child’ behalf in the one-parent household that exists at the time of the order.
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The second required value is the noncustodial parent’s share of expenditures up to Point B.
Here we must note a crucial difference between the dual-obligation component and the well-being
component. The well-being component arises only in cases in which the custodial household, by
itself, does not have sufficient resources to reach the well-being maximum. The support payments
are intended to bring the custodial household closer to that level. But because members of a
household generally share a living standard, child support payments will necessarily confer benefits
on the custodial parent (just as other sources of custodial parent income, including, e.g., alimony,
will necessarilyconfer benefits on the child). The policymaker must determine the appropriate trade-
off in choosing between a higher award, which invites obligor objections to the benefits it
unavoidably bestows on third parties like the custodial parent, or a lower award, which can
compromise child well-being. No similar tradeoff arises, however, in determining the dual-obligation
component. By definition, the dual-obligation component arises only when the income of the child’s
household puts it at or beyond the well-being maximum. The payment’s purpose is not to push child
well-being past this point, but to reimburse the custodial parent for his or her outlays on the child’s
behalf that bring the child to this point. So long as the noncustodial parent is asked only to pay his
or her fair share of those outlays, there can be no objections to conferring benefits on the custodial
parent. Put another way, the dual-obligation component should cover the noncustodial parent’s share
of the additional (marginal) expenditures the custodial parent must make on account of the child’s
presence in the household (but ignoring expenditures exceeding the well-being maximum, which
high-income custodial households will likely make).
Of course, in basing estimates of the dual-obligation component on marginal expenditures
on the child, we mimic the conception that lies behind the conventional method currently used to
generate the entirety of support guidelines, which also uses marginal expenditures, and which was
criticized on that account in the first part of this chapter. But while a marginal child expenditures
measure is not properly the entire measure of child support, it is the appropriate measure of the dual-
obligation component, whose purpose is partial reimbursement of the custodial parent, not child
well-being.36
What we have not yet considered here is how to determine the noncustodial parent’s fair
share of the custodial parent’s marginal expenditures on their child. The conventional income shares
system of support would assume that the parental shares should be proportional to the parental
incomes. We accept that assumption now but revisit it below when we consider the Earner’s Priority
Principle.
Principle 2 summarizes this discussion of the dual-obligation component.
Principle 2: Where the custodial household has sufficient income to enjoy a living standard
at or above the well-being maximum, a support award is justified to ensure that the other parent
contributes his or her fair share to the expenditures required to bring the custodial household to (but
37. Assume that M = the marginal expenditure rate–the percentage of total household expenditures made
necessary by the presence of the child or children in the household. Assume that P = the noncustodial parent’s fair share,
equal at first cut to the noncustodial parent’s proportionate share of total parental income. Assume B is the income or
expenditure level at which the well-being maximum is reached for the number of children in question in a one-parent
custodial household. Assume Cp is custodial parent income. Then,
(1) where Cp > B, the award consists entirely of the dual obligation component, and equals MPB.
(2) where Cp < B, the award equals the sum of the appropriate well-being and dual-obligation components, or
P (B-Cp) + MPCp
These preliminary computations do not take account of adjustments we may wish to make in P on account of
the EPP: at noncustodial parent incomes that are absolutely low, or low relative to the custodial parent income, we are
likely to set P at a level below his or her proportionate share of total parental income. This is considered below.
38. Yong-Seong Kim and Frank P. Stafford, The Quality of PSID Income Data in the 1990's and Beyond
(2000), Table 3 (University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, available on the internet at
<http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Guide/Quality/q_inc_data.html>. )
39. For example, Arizona provides a statutory cap when "the combined adjusted gross income of the parties
is greater than $20,000 per month, [in which case] the amount set forth for combined adjusted gross income of $20,000
shall be the presumptive basic child support obligation.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-320(8) (2005). The court may consider
the parties’ arguments that a higher award is warranted, on a case by case basis. Id. The Massachusetts statutory cap
is set where the parties’ combined gross income is $135,000, or where the non-custodial parent’s income exceeds
$100,000. In those cases, the minimum presumptive level of support for the $135,000 or $100,000 income group is to
be awarded, though “[a]dditional amounts of child support may be awarded at the judge's discretion." Mass. C.S.G. II(c)
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not beyond) that level. The appropriate award is the obligor’s fair share of the marginal expenditures
made necessary by the child’s presence in the custodial household, comparing the expenditures
required for the custodial household to live at the well-being maximum, with the expenditures
required to provide the same living standard to a household without the child. Where the custodial
household has sufficient income to approach but not quite reach the well-being maximum, the
support award will have both a well-being component and a dual-obligation component.
Comment. For cases in which the custodial household approaches but does not reach the well-
being maximum, the combined effect of the well-being and dual-obligation components may be
calculated through the method noted in the margin.37
C. The Gross Disparity Component.
The first two principles seek to ensure, respectively, that a) the custodial household has the
income necessary to ensure measurable child well-being, and b) that the obligor contributes his
proportionate share of these well-being expenses, even if the custodial household has sufficient
income to meet them on its own. We now consider a third group of cases involving noncustodial
parents whose income well exceeds what’s required to provide for measurable well-being. For the
purpose of this discussion, let us continue to assume that Point B in Figure 1–the well-being
maximum–is reached at family incomes at the 75th percentile, which was about $60,000 in 2000.38
Some states cap awards so they do not increase beyond specified income levels, while others
allow judicial discretion above specified income levels. But the typical state guideline calls for
awards that continue to rise with obligor income well beyond the point at which the custodial
household reaches the 75th income percentile.39 The question is why. Evidence of popular views is
(2005). In New York, where the combined parties’ income exceeds $80,000, the court is given discretion to order
support after considering “the factors set forth in paragraph (f) of this subdivision [pertaining to the parties’ and the
child’s financial status and living standards] and/or the child support percentage." N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240(1-b)(c)(3)
(2005). Oklahoma’s guidelines provide that when the parties’ “combined gross monthly income exceeds Fifteen
Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00), the child support shall be that amount computed for a monthly income of Fifteen
Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) and an additional amount determined by the court.” Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 119(B) (2005).
In South Dakota, where the parties combined income exceeds [$10,000 monthly], “the child support obligation shall be
established at an appropriate level, taking into account the actual needs and standard of living of the child.” S.D. Cod.
Laws § 25-7-6.9 (2005). Wisconsin sets no statutory cap, but the court may “modify” the child support award if “the
court finds . . . that use of the percentage standard is unfair to the child or to any of the parties” after a consideration of
various financial factors including the parties’ incomes and living standards. Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 767.25(1m) (West
2005).
40. A 1985 telephone survey of randomly chosen Wisconsin residents presented them with a variety of vignettes
with varying incomes: the noncustodial fathers in their examples earned from $500 a month to $5000, and the mothers
from nothing to $1500. The respondents favored support amounts that increased with the obligor-father’s income through
this entire range. Nora Schaeffer, Principles of Justice in Judgments About Child Support, 69 Social Forces 157 (1990).
It appears that the same survey data are also presented in Corbett, Garfinkel and Schaeffer, Public Opinion About a Child
Support Assurance System, in GARFINKEL, MCLANAHAN, AND ROBINS, CHILD SUPPORT ASSURANCE: DESIGN ISSUES,
EXPECTED IMPACTS, AND POLITICAL BARRIERS AS SEEN FROM WISCONSIN 339-364 (1992). They indicate that some
respondents were asked to identify the appropriate support amount in dollars, while others were asked to identify it as
a percentage of the father’s income. The average response (for a one-child family, across all income amounts) of those
who answered in dollars, when converted to percentages, was 21.4%, while the average for those who answered directly
in percentages was 24.7%.There was a drop-off in the percentage of the father’s income that respondents thought he
should be required to pay in support, as paternal income reached the highest amounts respondents were asked about, but
the dollar amount of the award continued to go up with paternal income. These surveys also found considerable
dispersion in the answers given by respondents, making the group means less meaningful.
41. American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, § 3.04(1).
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largely unavailable. The few studies we have find respondents favoring support awards that increase
with obligor income, but these studies do not typically ask about incomes above the 75th percentile.40
The American Law Institute recommends that once the custodial household has been assured a
minimum decent living standard, additional support amounts are appropriate to provide the child “a
standard of living not grossly inferior to that of either parent.”41 This clause, which by its terms
becomes applicable only when the support obligor’s income exceeds both the custodial parent’s, and
the level needed to ensure the child a minimum decent living standard, would also explain support
awards that raise custodial household income above the well-being maximum. The ALI position
could be described as a compromise between fully honoring the child’s claim to living as well as the
financially comfortable noncustodial parent, and fully honoring the support obligor’s objections to
providing support beyond that needed to ensure measurable child well-being. But is such a claim for
the child valid, and is such a compromise appropriate?
The law does not require parents in intact families to provide a child with more than basic
needs. That rule, however, is not based on a considered judgment that basic needs are all the child
is entitled to. It is rather a particular instance of the law’s more general reluctance to intervene in
intact families. The law therefore defers to a very wide range of parental choices concerning
expenditures on their children: almost any parental choice that does not threaten the child’s health
42. See the studies described in Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS 81-85 (2002).
43. For a description of the experimental evidence on the impact of control, with references to the primary
literature, see DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 20-23 (2006).
44. See the studies described in Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS 86-90 (2002). See
also ROBERT FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS, The Free Press, 1999.
45. Frank, id.
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or safety is accepted. Similarly, the law never concerns itself with the parental choice about where
the child should live, other than rare and extreme cases in which the parents needlessly expose the
child to a dangerous environment. In separated families, however, when the parents do not agree,
the law cannot defer to parental choice because the parents present competing choices. The law must
therefore pick between the conflicting (and potentially self-interested) parental choices, even when
both lie within the ordinary range of reasonableness. This can happen in the context of custody
(should the child live with the competent and loving mother in California or the competent and
loving father in New York?) or here, in the context of support (should parental expenditures on the
child be limited to those that have a demonstrated impact on measurable well-being, or should the
child be more fully protected from avoidable reductions in living standard?).
Embedded in this public policy choice is a reasonable debate over whether additional
household income beyond the well-being maximum can be justified as serving any interest of the
child’s. Award proponents might argue that standard well-being measures simply fail to capture real
well-being gains contributed by additional dollars in the higher-income range. Certainly, even
affluent adults welcome additional income. The relationship between income and one’s subjective
sense of well-being (SWB) is not linear, and research clearly suggests that additional income has
more impact on SWB at lower income levels than at higher levels. But studies also find a positive
correlation between income and happiness at higher income levels even after correcting for other
factors, such as age, gender and health, that also influence such self-reports.42
One likely reason for the income-SWB connection is that additional income promises greater
choice and control in one’s life, and people like choice and control. Indeed, there is evidence that a
sense of control contributes to human health as well as happiness.43 Additional income may offer the
same amenity to children, even if the increased choice is not entirely theirs to make, but must be
shared, or even made, by their parents (or their custodial parent). For example, people may see value
in a wider choice about where the child lives or what school the child attends, even if there are no
studies demonstrating that such wider choice has an important positive impact on measurable child
well-being. So greater choice and control is one reason people may favor transfers to custodial
households with income beyond the measurable well-being maximum.
A second possible reason is associated with the mounting evidence that, as economists have
increasingly recognized, relative income is what people care about most of all.44 That is because
income is important not only for the intrinsic value of the particular amenities that additional dollars
may purchase, but also for the improved social status that accompanies an advance in one’s position
in the overall income distribution.45 People’s sense of how well-off they are is strongly affected by
their position relative to those immediately around them. Protecting this sense of relative well-being
46. There is evidence that one consequence of divorce is a reduction in financial contributions of noncustodial
parents to their children during their later adult years. Furstenberg, Hoffman, and Shrestha, The Effect of Divorce on
Intergenerational Transfers: New Evidence, 32 Demography 319 (1995). This kind of program might be seen as an
appropriate corrective to that tendency.
26
may not seem a very compelling social concern, as a general matter. It is different, however, when
the question is the child’s living standard relative to the noncustodial parent’s, and especially when
the child and the noncustodial parent previously lived in the same household and shared a living
standard. In that case the support obligor’s living standard is a more natural benchmark against
which to judge the child’s. And the gap may be more salient to the child when it is not only a gap
as compared to the absent parent’s current household, but also as compared to the child’s own prior
household. A living standard decline is experienced as a decline in well-being, even if the new and
reduced living standard is above the societal median. Those who have advanced to the median enjoy
a greater sense of well-being than those who have fallen to it. Finally, the expected process of
accommodation to new circumstances may not work as well for the child who experiences a living
standard decline from divorce, if the child is regularly re-exposed to the gap between his current
living standard and that of the noncustodial parent he visits. Indeed, if the noncustodial parent has
new children living with him, who share that parent’s superior living standard, the salience of the
gap may be increased further.
Some will be less persuaded than others by the foregoing arguments for a gross disparity
component in support. All the components of a child support award are limited by the earner’s
priority principle, discussed more fully in the next section, but the gross disparity component is
especially sensitive to this counter-consideration. The gross disparitycomponent is easy to minimize
or reject if one sees it as a claim to provide an already adequately-circumstanced child non-essential
amenities, because the natural conclusion is that the support obligor is entitled to give himself
priority in the use of his own earnings to provide such amenities. That conclusion is strengthened
by the reality that it is not possible to ensure the child a living standard close to the support obligor’s
without providing it to the custodial parent as well, an inevitable but unintended (and some would
say undeserving) beneficiary of the support payment. The skeptic’s conclusion might then be that
while we must tolerate this unavoidable diversion, so to speak, of the support payment when the
child’s measurable well-being lies in the balance, we should not tolerate it to provide the child non-
essentials.
People clearly vary in their resolution of these questions, and in the end the guideline writer
must make a value judgment about it. That judgment could be aided considerably by systematic
information about the public’s intuitions. They could reveal, for example, that the child’s claim to
share the absent parent’s living standard is viewed sympathetically, but is ultimately rejected because
of strong objection to the custodial parent’s sharing the benefits of higher payments. One might then
find wider support for the gross disparity component if all or some portion of it were required to be
deposited into an segregated account that may only be applied to expenditures conferring benefit on
the child alone, including perhaps expenditures we would not ordinarily require of the obligor, such
as the cost of college or of private school.46
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Principle 3 summarizes our discussion of the gross disparity component.
Principle 3. Child support awards mayinclude a component intended to protect children from
declines in their living standard that leave them at a level below, and grossly disparate to, the living
standard of the support obligor, even if the child’s household already enjoys an income exceeding
the well-being maximum, or will exceed it if this component is included in the award. In determining
the extent and nature of such awards, guideline writers should be assisted by scientifically valid
surveys of public views about the appropriate way to balance the conflicting claims that arise in
connection with this component, including provision for the segregation of such funds in separate
accounts that might be applied to provide the child with beneficial goods or services beyond those
included in the standard support order.
D. The Earner’s Priority Principle
The earner’s priority principle is a pompous name for an entirely obvious idea, that
everyone gets to keep what they have in the absence of some very good reason to take it from them.
While the EPP always applies, its power in the child support context varies with both the earner’s
circumstances and the child’s, and is thus a factor to account for. The EPP explains, among other
things, why income shares states sometimes depart from their usual rule allocating the support
burden between the parents in proportion to their incomes.
1. Obligors Cannot Be Impoverished. The self-support reserve, included in most state
guidelines, shields impoverished obligors from onerous support obligations. It is more than a child
support analog to progressive taxation. Progressivity could explain the self-support reserve if it
merely shifted most or all the support burden from the impoverished noncustodial parent to
financially self-sufficient custodial parent. But most states also allow application of a self-support
reserve when both the custodial household, and the support obligor, are financially stressed. That
practice cannot be explained by a progressivity principle. Concerns about the practicality of
collecting support obligations from the impoverished may contribute to practice, but the entire
explanation probably includes the belief that while the failure to provide funds to alleviate custodial
household poverty is bad, taking funds from the impoverished obligor is even worse. The earner’s
priority principle is strongest when the earner has the least.
2. Obligors Are Entitled to Retain Some Priority in the Use of Their Own Income. The EPP
can matter even when the obligor is not impoverished. No state knowingly requires an obligor who
is financially more comfortable than the custodial household to pay child support in amounts that
would leave him worse off than the custodial parent, even if doing so would improve child well-
being and would not impoverish the obligor. So the EPP also means we do not intentionally require
an obligor to make the child financially better-off than himself. This is perhaps the minimal
statement of the principle. A more aggressive version allows the earner to retain at least some of any
living standard advantage he may enjoy over the custodial household. The American Law Institute
supports this more aggressive version, once the custodial household is assured of a minimum decent
47. See Elaine Walster, G. William Walster, and Ellen Berscheid, EQUITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH (Allyn and
Bacon 1978).
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living standard: once the child is above that threshhold, it requires additional support only to ensure
that the child’s living standard not be “grossly inferior” to the obligor’s. And in fact, rules requiring
awards that establish equal living standards in the CP and NCP households, though long urged by
some, have never knowingly been adopted, and the reason is surely, at least in part, objection to
equalizing the living standard of the two parents under the child support rubric. Equity theory teaches
that people believe that outcomes should be related to inputs, and feel distress when they are not,
even if they are the beneficiary of the inequity.47 The benefit to the custodial parent seems in this
circumstance to constitute such an inequity. Some custodial parents will have claims in their own
right to share the other parent’s post-separation income, but alimony is the rubric under which such
claims are supposed to considered. If custodial parent has no valid claim under that legal regime,
realizing its equivalent from child support payments seems to many an unjustified windfall for the
custodial parent and an unjustified injury to the child support obligor.
Every child support award requires compromise between justified claims a) on behalf of the
child, certainly for the funds necessary to well-being but also to share the obligor’s living standard,
and b)on behalf of the obligor, to resist coerced contribution to the custodial parent’s living standard.
The less compelling is the child’s claim, the more powerful is the obligor’s objection. The child’s
claim is most compelling when there is evidence that the child’s well-being would be endangered
by lower levels of support. But as we move from awards protecting child well-being, to awards
ensuring the child a living standard comparable to the support obligor’s, the EPP becomes relatively
more weighty.
3. The Questionable Dual-Obligation Exception. There is one group of cases in which most
support guidelines seem to require results inconsistent with protecting obligors from support
obligations that bring them below the custodial household living standard. These are the cases in
which the obligor’s living standard is below the custodial household’s before any support payment.
The particularly striking cases involve obligors living far below the custodial household standard.
So for example, all support guidelines would require more than symbolic payments bya noncustodial
parent earning $25,000 annually, to a custodial parent earning $65,000. Yet any payment will reduce
the obligor’s living standard even further below the custodial household’s. This result seems to
conflict with the EPP, and is especially difficult to defend when the custodial household is near or
above the well-being maximum before any payment is made. Awards in these cases consist entirely
of a dual-obligation component, a less compelling rationale for overriding the EPP than is concern
about the child’s well-being. A nominal award seems more appropriate in such cases, as sufficient
to serve the symbolic purpose of confirming the legitimacy of the noncustodial parent’s status as
parent, and to uphold the principle that both parents must contribute to the child’s support.
In fact, actual practice appears to conform to this recommendation favoring nominal awards,
even if the formal guidelines do not. Both family law practitioners and judges observe that when the
proposed obligor earns significantly less than the custodial parent, the parties usually agree to reduce
or even waive the award called for by the guidelines. Guidelines should probably be revised to
29
conform to this practice, which is also consistent with the analysis here.
Principles 4 and 5 state conclusions that follow from this discussion of the EPP.
Principle 4. Child support awards should ask no more than nominal amounts from
impoverished obligors, and should avoid reducing obligor income below poverty levels.
Operationalizing this Principle requires establishing the poverty level to employ. Guidelines should
specify a gradual transition from nominal awards to more meaningful awards as obligor income rises
above the specified poverty level.
Principle 5. Where possible without sacrificing important interests of the child, support
awards should leave the higher-earning obligor with some advantage in living standard over the
custodial household. However, ensuring the impoverished custodial household a “minimum decent
living standard” (Point A) is a sufficiently important interest to override this usual preference , and
in such cases the award may equalize the household living standards rather than leaving the obligor
with a living standard advantage. Operationalizing this principle requires establishing a benchmark
for the minimum decent living standard. No interest of the child is normally sufficient to justify an
award reducing the obligor’s living standard below that of the custodial household. Where the
obligor’s living standard is substantially below the custodial household before any child support
transfer, the amount of the required support payment is appropriately reduced from the level that
would otherwise apply.
III. Constructing Guidelines Consistent with Policy
The combined impact of all five Principles is represented in Figure Three, a 16-cell matrix
considering four levels of Custodial Parent Income, going from Low to High as one proceeds
vertically downward through the rows, and four levels of Noncustodial Parent Income, going from
Low to High as one proceeds to the right through the columns. One can imagine the support award
consisting of a base amount that is the dual-obligation component, with upward or downward
adjustments to that base amount to reflect the requirements of the well-being component, the gross
disparity component, and the EPP. Figure Three thus presents an overall view of how these
principles interact. It can also help direct attention to patterns that can help a policymaker choose
the trade-offs that make the most sense. In Cells 1 through 8, representing lower levels of CP
income, we will want, insofar as possible, to obtain awards that raise the custodial household higher
along the child well-being curve. Raising the household above Point A is especially important, but
even beyond that, at these income levels additional dollars seem likely to yield fairly good returns
in child well-being. This means that we may be able to tolerate greater inroads in the EPP than we
would tolerate in Cells 9 through 16. Nonetheless, support levels will still be very low in Cells 1 and
5, where the EPP is strongest because obligor income is so low, so that in these cells it is unlikely
the support payment will contribute much to raising custodial household income above Point A.
Public funds are really the only hope for children with parents at these income levels. Cells 2 and
6 will allow greater demands on the obligor, but it is still likely, especially for Cell 2, that any
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support payment will still leave the custodial household at well-being levels we will be dissatisfied
with.
Other patterns revealed by the matrix will also be helpful. Consider especially these two:
The Equal-Earner Diagonal: Cells 1, 6, 11, 16. These cells all involve parents who are
equal earners. For this situation, a support amount that leaves the custodial and noncustodial
households with approximately equal living standards would seem fair, insofar as we can gauge it.
While equal living standards may sometimes seem a windfall for the custodial parent to which the
obligor will object, there is no windfall where the parents are equal earners, as an equal living
standard will naturally result in that case if we require the equal-earning parents to make an equal
ecoonomic sacrifice for the children. This result also allows the custodial household the highest
living standard possible without requiring the obligor to live less well than the child and custodial
parent. Nonetheless, even in this case, the EPP will, for the very low earning obligor in Cell 1, bar
a meaningful award, assuming we apply a self-support reserve.
Cell pairs: 2&5, 3&9, 4&13, 7&10, 8&14, 12&15. Total parental income, and thus the living
standard of the intact family, is the same in both members of each of these cell pairs. What differs
is the relative income contributions of the custodial and noncustodial parents. From the child’s
perspective, that does not matter, and Principles 1 and 3 therefore lead to the conclusion that the
support award should yield the same post-payment income for the custodial household in both cells
of each pair. No child support system in the country produces this result, however, and the
explanation is Principle 5. By focusing on these cells pairs, the policymakers can resolve the relative
weights they wish to give Principles 1, 3 and 5. Some variation in the relative weights might be
anticipated in a rationally designed system, because in some pairs the claims of the child in the
lower-earning custodial household are stronger than in other pairs. The children in Cells 5, 9, and
13 have stronger Principle 1 claims, for example, than the children in Cell 15, whose claims are
grounded more in Principle 3. Having resolved these weights across all these cell pairs would,
however, permit reasonable interpolations to fill in the remaining cells in the grid.
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Figure Three: Combined Impact of All Principles Across Incomes
NONCUSTODIAL PARENT INCOME
CP
INCOME ?
LOW LOW
MEDIAN
HIGH
MEDIAN
HIGH
LOW 1 2 3 4
LOW MEDIAN 5 6 7 8
HIGH
MEDIAN
9 10 11 12
HIGH 13 14 15 16
LEGEND
Square Shading: As squares go from dark to light, the base award shifts from consisting
primarily of the well-being component, to consisting primarily of the dual-obligation component.
Intermediate shades consist mostly of one but may contain some of the other.
Award substantially augmented by Gross Disparity Component
Award somewhat augmented by Gross Disparity Component
Award substantially reduced by EPP
Award somewhat reduced by EPP
48. The literature contains various estimates of such marginal expenditure rates. For child support purposes,
consultants generally rely on an equivalence scale methodology to derive marginal expenditures, but the choice of
equivalence scale–there are many candidates–is largely arbitrary and they give differing results. See Fudging Failure
at 189-199. For a more ambitious investigation into the matter, see Edward Lazear and Robert Michael, ALLOCATION
OF INCOME WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD (Chicago 1988). While they do not rely directly on an equivalence scale method,
Lazear and Michael base their calculations on the allocation of clothing expenditures among members of the household,
using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Their calculations are thus subject to the same concerns about
accuracy that also apply to calculations based upon the Rothbarth equivalence scale, see Fudging Failure, supra. One
must also bear in mind all these estimate purport to tell us only the mean marginal expenditure rate; to the extent this
mean is relied upon to set policy, the amount of dispersion around that mean may matter. Bassi and Barnow, relying on
figures in Chapter 7 of Lazear and Michael, estimate that if the mean expenditure on two children in a two-parent
household is 27 percent of all expenditures, one has to employ a range of 15 to 36 percent to capture 80 percent of those
families, with the remaining 20 percent evenly divided between those below 15 and those above 36. Laurie J. Bassi and
Burt S. Barnow, Expenditures on Children and Child Support Guidelines, 12 J Pol Anal and Manage 478, 486 (1993).
It is precisely because estimates of marginal expenditure rates on children are subject to such dispute that one’s choice
of rate is necessarily a policy decision that reflects one’s view about the best compromise in the face of imperfect
information. Technical consultants can inform that policy choice but cannot make it.
49. The availability of such a template was important to the decision of an Arizona committee, appointed by
the Arizona Supreme Court, to recommend changes in that state’s guidelines consistent with the analysis of this article.,
because it demonstrated that a practical method to implement this analysis was available. The spreadsheet uses the
income required by the single noncustodial parent to achieve the minimum decent living standard to set the self-support
reserve the guideline will allow the poor obligor. The marginal expenditure rate is applied to the custodial parent’s
income to generate an estimate of that parent’s marginal expenditures on the child, which are then allocated between the
two parents in proportion to their income, yielding the dual-obligation component of the applicable support payment.
In generating this figure the spreadsheet uses the chosen self-support reserve to reduce the support award below that
amount, as appropriate for low-income obligors. The chosen value for Point B yields the maximum value for the dual
obligation component, because that component should not include any marginal expenditures on the child for income
exceeding Point B.
Once the spreadsheet thus generates the value of the dual-obligation component for any particular set of parental
incomes and household composition, the chosen values for Points A and B provide benchmarks to the policymaker who
must decide the extent to which the actual support award should depart from the amount needed to achieve at least Point
A and if possible Point B. The spreadsheet provides the user with the custodial household’s income, after the addition
of the dual obligation support payment, as a percentage of both Point A and Point B. These benchmarks figures are
automatically updated as the user makes experiments with trial adjustments to the dual-obligation figures, to take account
of the well-being and gross-disparity components. At the same time, the spreadsheet provides the user with both the
custodial household income, and the obligor’s income, as a percentage of the income needed to maintain a minimum
decent living standard, and also shows the support payment as a percent of the obligor’s income. These benchmarks also
change dynamically as the user experiments with adjustments in the support amount, providing the user a way to gauge
the limits that the EPP should place on the support payments. The Arizona committee recommended a process in which
the guideline writers first choose support amounts for thirty-six cases representing the interaction of six income levels
each for obligor and obligee, spanning a range of incomes that includes most support cases. The consultant would then
produce from this initial approximation a matrix with twelve income levels each, interpolating from the six-income grid
that committee produced as an initial approximation, and highlighting for the committee any cases in which that
interpolation required new policy determinations. Once the twelve by twelve table was settled on, the consultant could
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An essential aid to policymakers implementing the approach suggested here is a simple
spreadsheet template that shows them the child support results that flow from choices they make
about the value of Points A and B, the income required by a single noncustodial parent to maintain
a minimum decent living standard, and the marginal expenditure rate for a given number of children
in a single parent household48. An example of such a spreadsheet template is available from the
authors.49
produce, through interpolation, a complete table of support amounts for the full range of incomes addressed by the state’s
guidelines.
The Arizona committee offers examples of cases in which the committee is likely to reduce the support amount
below the dual-obligation component, as well as others in which it will increase it above that level. Of course, other
benchmarks, in addition or instead of those suggested here, could be employed to aid the committee in its decisions. The
fundamental point is that a procedure of this kind allows the policymaker to judge how to balance the relevant factors
in a sample of cases at a variety of points along the spectrum of incomes and household composition. At some point, the
policymaker will have made a sufficient number of such judgments to allow a technical consultant to interpolate missing
values and construct a complete set of support guidelines.
50. See the provisions set forth in notes 52, 55, and 56, below.
51. Divorce rates have generally been declining since 1980. Although the decline is significant, and the duration
of this trend of declining rates unprecedented in American history, divorce rates are still higher than they were in the
early 1960's, before the steep increases between 1965 and 1979 took place. See Ira Ellman and Sharon Lohr, Dissolving
the Relationship Between Divorce Law and Divorce Rates, 18 International Review of Law and Economics
341 (1998).
52. E.g., Arizona’s statutes provide that a “parent's legal duty is to support his or her natural or adopted children.
The support of other persons such as stepchildren or parents is deemed voluntary and is not a reason for an adjustment
in the amount of child support determined under the guidelines.” Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 25-320(2)(D) (2004).
53. 670 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. App. 2003).
54. Even this reduced support obligation was suspended because of medical evidence of the father’s disability,
making this perhaps a particularly appealing case for such an adjustment.
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D. Complicating Realities
1. Remarriage of the Custodial Parent, and other additions to the custodial household
Existing law in most states seems to exclude from consideration the income of the custodial
parent’s new spouse.50 These rules long preceded the trends of the late 1960's and the1970's that
elevated divorce rates and led to increased numbers of remarried custodial parents.51 This increase
in “blended families” gives these rules more importance. The logic of the stepparent-income
exclusion is straightforward. The new spouse, it is said, has no legal obligation under the law to
provide for children that are not his.52 To assume his income is available to his wife’s children, and
then reduce their legal father’s support obligation accordingly, is therefore wrong because it would,
in effect, require him to support another man’s children without legal basis. Yet this doctrinal logic
seems in tension with the realities of household finances. Most custodial parents are mothers, and
when they remarry their husband usually earns at least as much as they do, and most often more. The
new husband’s income thus typically improves the living standard of the custodial household.
Regardless of whether the law requires the new husband to support his new wife’s children, the
addition of his income to the custodial household inevitably has that effect. This tension between
doctrine and reality can be seen in the cases. For example, in Long v. Creighton,53 the custodial
mother testified that she earned $22,000 a year from her hair styling business, but her new husband
earned $45,000 annually, and covered her and children on his health insurance policy. Asked the
percentage of household expenses she pays, she said "It's all joint, it's all combined. Our monies are
combined." On that basis the trial court assumed she was responsible for only her proportionate share
of the household expenses and reduced the support order accordingly.54 This reduction was reversed
on the mother’s appeal.
55. The idea that a stepparent has no legal support obligation is overtly expressed in the New Jersey child
support guidelines, which exclude “income from other household members (e.g., step-parents, grandparents, current
spouse) who are not legally responsible for the support of the child for whom support is being established.” N.J. R. Prac.
App. IV-B(1) (2005) (See (f) in the “Instructions for Determining Income: Types of Income Excluded from Gross
Income” section). Likewise, Minnesota’s provision excludes a stepparent’s income from the “net income” calculation
on which support payments are partially based. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.551 (2005). New Mexico’s statute provides that,
“[t]he gross income of a parent means only the income and earnings of that parent and not the income of subsequent
spouses, notwithstanding the community nature of both incomes after remarriage.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-11.1(C)(1)
(2005). Utah’s statute similarly excludes stepparent income from the “adjusted gross income” calculation on which it
bases child support payments. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.4 (2005). In Washington, though all household income must
be disclosed, “[o]nly the income of the parents of the children whose support is at issue shall be calculated for purposes
of calculating the basic support obligation. Income and resources of any other person shall not be included in calculating
the basic support obligation.” Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.19.071(1) (West 2005).
56. Current Connecticut guidelines expressly exclude “the income and regularly recurring contributions or gifts
of a spouse or domestic partner,” Conn. Agencies Regs. § 46b-215a-1(11)(B)(v) (2005); they were enacted after the
Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350, 364-65, 710 A.2d 717, 725-26 (1998)
which held that the new spouse’s income could be considered in support orders as “gifts” to the parent. The Connecticut
regulations now allow consideration of “regularly recurring” gifts “only if it is found that the parent has reduced his or
her income or has experienced an extraordinary reduction or his or her living expenses as a direct result or such
contributions or gifts.” Conn. Agencies Regs. § 46b-215a-3(b)(1)(D). Current Idaho law overruled Yost v. Yost, 112
Idaho 677, 735 P.2d 988 (1987) in which the court held that income of wife’s new marital community should be
considered in child support determinations. The new statututory provisions direct the court to consider “[t]he financial
resources, needs, and obligations of both the custodial and noncustodial parents which ordinarily shall not include a
parent's community property interest in the financial resources or obligations of a spouse who is not a parent of the child,
unless compelling reasons exist.” Idaho Code Ann. § 32-706(1)(b) (2005).
57. Van Dyke v. Thompson, 95 Wn.2d 726, 729, 630 P.2d 420 (1981). The common law duty applied to any
stepparent who acted “in loco parentis” toward the child, but that requirement is almost always fulfilled by the
stepparent’s voluntarily accepted the child into his home. Decisions grounded on this common law doctrine include
Harris v. Lyon, 16 Ariz. 1, 140 P. 825 (1914); State v. Smith, 485 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (position stepparent
assumes for himself determines if he stands in loco parentis, and if he voluntarily receives child into family and treats
it as a member thereof, he may be said to be standing in place of natural parent); Schneider v. Schneider, 25 N.J. Misc.
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Long [claims that] the district court's reduction [is] a violation of the statutory
prohibition on considering the financial circumstances of her current spouse. We
agree. Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5(b)(1) (2002), explicitly excludes from the
definition of net income "the income of the obligor's spouse." Although the district
court did not base its determination of Long's net income on a direct consideration
of her spouse's income, when the court found that Long's spouse is responsible for
69% of the family's total expenses because he earns 69% of the family's total income,
the court indirectly made Long's spouse responsible for the support of Long's
children. No case law or statute imposes a legal duty upon a new spouse to provide
support for his or her step-children.
So the court did not deny the economic reality; it simply concluded that this reality provided
no basis for departing from the legal rule excluding the stepparent’s income from the child support
calculation. Not only are versions of this rule are common,55 but some courts that have held to the
contrary have been overruled by their legislature.56 Yet in many if not most states, the prevailing
legal rule is more nuanced than suggested by the language of the Long opinion. Indeed, the common
law requires stepparents to support and educate stepchildren living with them.57 A recent compilation
180, 52 A.2d 564 (Ch. Div. 1947) (if stepfather voluntarily accepts into his family a child of his wife by a former husband
and assumes the obligations of a parent, such obligation continues as long as he permits the child to be in his home); and
Palmer v. Harrold, 101 Ohio App. 3d 732, 656 N.E.2d 708 (1995) (stepparent is liable for support of stepchild during
marriage to natural parent under doctrine of in loco parentis).
58. Laura Wish Morgan,The Duty of Stepparents to Support Their Stepchildren, posted August 1999 on
SupportGuidelines.com, <http://www.childsupportguidelines.com/articles/art199908.html>. . Provisions such as these
are typically found in different portions of the statutes than the support guidelines. Guideline provisions that exclude
stepparent support obligations prevail over such statutes when the question is whether a court may require the stepparent
to provide support in a case governed by the guidelines. Harmon v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 134 Wn.2d 523,
951 P.2d 770 (1998).
59. E.g., see Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 26.16.205:
The expenses of the family and the education of the children, including stepchildren, are
chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, and they may be sued jointly
or separately. When a petition for dissolution of marriage or a petition for legal separation is filed, the
court may, upon motion of the stepparent, terminate the obligation to support the stepchildren. The
obligation to support stepchildren shall cease upon the entry of a decree of dissolution, decree of legal
separation, or death.
For other state family expense statutes effectively requiring stepparent support see Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §
501(b) (1999) (expanding duty to include cohabitors if natural parentis not supporting); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-6-217
(2003); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-09 (1997).
60. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.205 (1997).
61. See e.g. the Washington statute quoted in Note 59.
62. “The income of the natural or adoptive parent, and the spouse of the natural or adoptive parent, and the
sibling of an eligible child, living in the same home with an eligible child shall be considered available, in addition to
the income of an applicant for or recipient of aid . . . for purposes of eligibility determination and grant computation.”
Cal. Welf. and Inst. Code § 11008.14 (2005). See also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 44:10-36 (2005) (“A parent who is eligible for
benefits who is married to a person who is not the parent of one or more of the eligible parent's children shall not be
eligible for benefits if the household income exceeds the income eligibility standard.”). In the federal system, the same
is true of social security disability benefits: remarriage and resulting income may reduce or eliminate a recipient’s
benefits.). 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(b)(1)(H), (K). Some state’s welfare systems incorporate these definitions into their
definitions of income or eligibility. NewHampshire’s statute provides that “In the determination of sufficiency of income
and resources, [the fact finder] may disregard such income and resources as may be permitted by the Social Security Act
of the United States.” N.H. Rev. Stat. § 167:4(I)(a) (2005).
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found this common law rule effectively codified in twenty states that imposed a general stepparent
support obligation.58 There are also “family expense statutes” that effectively continue this rule59
because they allow creditors to reach stepparents for goods or services provided to stepchildren
living with them.60 Of course, such suits by creditors for payment of necessities are relatively rare.
While in principle the stepparent support obligation could also be enforced by the state, as practical
matter that will not happen. That is because, by its terms, the stepparent support duty normally ends
with the parties’ divorce, when children typically remain with their legal parent and thus no longer
live with the stepparent.61 So the stepparent support obligation exists only within the intact family.
The state, however, does not normally enforce support obligations within intact families unless the
failure to support amounts to abuse or neglect. But even if rarely enforced, the legal expectation that
stepparents will contribute to the support of children living with them does suggest something about
what we believe right, as well as what is economically inevitable. We would disapprove of a
stepfather who allows stepchildren living with him to suffer from limited resources when he has
sufficient income to provide for them, and that is at least part of the reason why states look to
stepparent income in determining eligibility for public benefits62 and colleges typically consider
63. New Hampshire provides that a stepparent’s income "shall not be considered as gross income to the parent
unless the parent resigns from or refuses employment or is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed". RSA 458-C:2,
IV(b). California provides for the same result, but as a particular application of a more general provision permitting
courts to consider the income of the spouse or nonmarital partner of either parent in “extraordinary” cases in which
excluding it would lead to extreme and severe hardship on the child subject to the order. California Family Code §
4057.5(b) (2005).
64. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458-C:5, I(c) (2005).
65. Barrett v. Coyne, 150 N.H. 520, 841 A.2d 74 (2004).
66. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-86(b) (West 2005).
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stepparent income in awarding need-based scholarships. But on the other hand, we do not believe
the existence of a stepfather excuses the legal father from his support obligations. What this tell us
is that the usual child support rule that excludes the income of a stepparent probably has less to do
with our view of the stepparent obligations than it does with our determination to make sure the legal
father is not let off the hook.
Might we reasonably compromise by allowing consideration of stepfather income to reduce
but not replace the legal father’s support obligation? In fact, states sometimes do this, although they
do not always characterize their actions in this way. One example arises in the application of income-
imputation rules. When calculating support, virtually all states will impute income to a parent
regarded as shirking employment, but not to a parent whose decision to reduce working hours is
considered reasonable in light of all the circumstances (as where reduced employment is thought
necessary to care for a young or disabled child). What then of the case in which a remarried custodial
mother, for example, reduces her working hours, perhaps to zero, because she now can rely on her
new husband’s income: in calculating the father’s support obligation, should the court impute a full-
time equivalent income to the mother (thus reducing the father’s support obligation) or should it
accept her actual reduced income as her income (thus increasing the father’s support obligation)?
States like California and New Hampshire impute a full-time income to this mother.63 They do not
deny it is reasonable for her to take her new husband’s income into account in deciding on her
working hours; they simply believe that her reasonable decision to reduce her income does not, in
this case, justify an increase in the father’s support payments. This conclusion necessarily accepts
the stepfather’s contribution to the children’s support as an appropriate factor to consider in fixing
the father’s support obligation. Such rules effectively recognize the reality that the new family is one
economic unit.
Some states allow courts to take stepparent income in a broader array of cases, because they
allow its consideration whenever judges decide whether to deviate from the guideline amounts. New
Hampshire, for example, combines the previously quoted rule with another provision that permits
the court, in deciding whether to deviate from the guidelines, to consider "the economic
consequences of the presence of stepparents."64 The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that
such deviations are not limited to the cases addressed by the first rule, involving remarried custodial
parents who are underemployed.65 Connecticut also endorses such deviation treatment.66 Louisiana
goes further, as it allows the court to consider, as income under the guidelines, “the benefits a party
derives from expense-sharing...to the extent such income is used directly to reduce the cost of a
67. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:315.2(C)(5)(c) (2005).
68. Idaho Code Ann. § 32-706(1)(b) (2005).
69. See, e.g., Nora Schaeffer, Principles of Justice in Judgments About Child Support, 69 Social Forces 157,
167 (1990). Another analysis of the same data set appears to replicate this finding. See Corbett, Garfinkel and Schaeffer,
Public Opinion About a Child Support Assurance System, in GARFINKEL, MCLANAHAN, AND ROBINS, CHILD SUPPORT
ASSURANCE: DESIGN ISSUES, EXPECTED IMPACTS, AND POLITICALBARRIERS AS SEEN FROM WISCONSIN 339-364 (1992).
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party’s actual expenses.”67 Idaho also allows consideration of such expense sharing benefits, but only
if “compelling reasons exist”.68
It is fair then to conclude that despite the general understanding that stepparent income is
excluded from support calculations, manystates make exceptions and qualifications to this exclusion
that reflect ambivalence about the basic rule. This ambivalence mirrors popular views: most people,
it appears, believe there are at least some cases in which the custodial mother’s remarriage to an
income earner warrants some reduction in the father’s support payments.69 There are several
explanations one might offer to explain these views. The fact that most support guidelines try to
allocate the support obligation between parents in proportion to their incomes may reflect an
intuition that such proportionalityachieves effective equalitybyequalizing the parental sacrifice. But
if the custodial parent benefits financially from her remarriage, then her relative "sacrifice" is less
than before. That point becomes especially salient where the custodial parent's new spouse earns
more money than the support obligor, because people are not entirely comfortable with a rule that
transfers money from a lower income household to a higher income household, especially when the
lower income household also has children, as it often does. This example also illustrates another
possible explanation of people's reactions: their likely perception that when the custodial parent
remarries the child's well-being may no longer depend nearly so much upon the support payments
if the new spouse has a good income.
The support principles offered in Part II lead to similar conclusions. Consider a custodial
mother earning $2500 a month, and a noncustodial father earning $5000. The required support
amount will be based largely on concerns for the child’s well-being (Principle 1); the dual obligation
component (Principle 2) will add little. But now assume the mother remarries, and her new husband
earns $7500. Principle 1 ceases to seem applicable, as even without any support payment, the child’s
living standard is likely to exceed the living standard in the original intact marriage and may
approach the well-being maximum. We are still reluctant to eliminate the support award entirely, but
that reluctance arises from Principle Two, which has now become much more relevant to this case.
That is, the remarriage has shifted the basis of the support award from concern for the child’s well-
being, to concern for maintaining the principle that a parent, including an absent parent, should
contribute to his child’s support. Along with that shift is an appropriate recalculation of the award’s
amount, which can be reduced because Principle 2, the dual-obligation component, yields more
easily to the EPP than Principle 1, the child’s well-being component. In this case, then, the obligor
need pay no more than his proportionate share of the marginal expenditures on the child that would
have been made by these two parents were they living together in an intact family with the child.
We reach a different conclusion if the new member of the custodial household generates
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marginal expenditures greater than his or her income. No adjustment to the support award is justified
in this case. The award certainly cannot be increased, because the obligor is not responsible for the
custodial household shortfall created by additional members for whom the obligor has no legal or
moral support obligation. But neither should his payments be reduced. The new members of the
custodial household, like the custodial parent, will inevitably reap some benefit from the existing
support payments, but that unavoidable fact cannot justify a reduction that would necessarily
penalize the child as well
2. Remarriage of the Obligor
A sense of symmetry might lead one to assume the same rules should govern the remarriage
of the support obligor as govern the remarriage of the custodial parent. But in the usual situation in
which the child lives primarily in one of the parental households, symmetrical treatment is
inappropriate. The support obligor’s remarriage has no direct impact on the financial well-being of
the child who is the intended beneficiary of the support order, and the obligor’s new spouse has no
obligation to the child. In most cases this is sufficient to conclude the remarriage has no effect on
the support order. The possible exception arises when the obligor was excused from more than
nominal support because of his very low income, but now marries someone with an ample income.
Especiallywhere the custodial household income is well below the well-being maximum, an upward
revision of the support award may be appropriate. We reach this result not because of our assessment
of the parental obligations has changed, but because the impact of the EPP on those obligations may
have changed. When the remarriage means the obligor is no longer impoverished, and will not
become impoverished if the support obligation is increased, then the force of the EPP, which
justified the initial choice of a nominal award only, is weakened.
CONCLUSION
The conventional method used to generate child support guidelines conceals important policy
choices from those charged with making them. A systematic analysis of the policy purposes for
collecting child support reveals that most existing guidelines are inconsistent with them. Careful
analysis of the policy issues suggests a superior alternative to the conventional methodology in
current use, and also helps to resolve the difficult problems created by the increasing incidence of
blended families containing both child support obligors and child support recipients.
70. The most recent version of this effort known to the authors is Maureen A. Pirog, Tara Grieshop, and Brooks
Elliot, Presumptive State Child Support Guidelines: A Decade of Experience, in Volume 12, No. 1 of Policy Currents
(Newsletter of the Public Policy Section American Political Science Association), Spring 2003, at page 16.
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Appendix A
A Comparative Sampling of Support Amounts Required by State Guidelines
The analysis in the text focuses on an example based upon the support guidelines of one state,
Arizona. Arizona is an “income shares” state, as are the great majority of American jurisdictions.
Ultimately, however, “income shares” means only that the incomes of both parents are necessary to
perform the support calculation, in contrast with states that set support amounts as a percentage of
the obligor’s income (POOI), without regard to the income of the custodial parent. Income shares
states vary considerably among themselves in the amount of support they would require in any
particular case, both because their guidelines set different basic support amounts at any given
parental income level, and because they vary in the adjustments they allow or require in transforming
this basic support amount into the actual support order. The differences among states are not easy
to capture, for several reasons.
First, the differences are not straightforward: it is not necessarily the case, for example, that
State A generally imposes support awards that are $100 or 15% higher than State B. State A might
impose higher support awards at lower parental income levels, but not at higher income levels, or
vice-versa, or the difference might get smaller or larger if one looks at families with one child versus
families with several children. Second, the methods states use to compute support amounts vary in
ways that make comparisons impossible without making assumptions about which reasonable
persons may differ. States vary, for example, on whether their guidelines require an input of gross
or net parental incomes. Arizona uses gross incomes, and therefore Table 1 does as well. But to
determine how that same family would come out in California, we must first choose net income
equivalents to these gross incomes, because the California guidelines require an input of net
incomes. And so, for example, one must make some assumption about the income tax liability of the
two parents in each of the three Table 1 cases. States also vary in their treatment of child care costs,
health insurance costs, and adjustments to reflect the amount of time the child spends with the
support obligor. Maureen A. Pirog and colleagues have perhaps the most useful general studyof how
child support guidelines vary across states, as well as over time, with periodic updates.70 Their
analysis focuses on four fact patterns that vary in both total parental income, and the income of each
parent. The purpose of Table 1, however, is to compare the outcome for a low income custodial
parent as the income of the other parent changes from low to high. The Pirog study does not examine
this kind of fact pattern set. We do so here, for Arizona, California, Massachusetts, New York,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. This small sample includes states that vary in
methodology (Wisconsin and New York are POOI states; the rest are income shares states), size, and
region, and also appear, from the Pirog data, to span the spectrum from low to high in the support
amounts they typically require (bearing in mind the limitations noted above about such
generalizations).
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Table A-1
Support Amounts, in Dollars and As % of NCP Income, With Post-Transfer CP Income
Shown as % of Poverty Threshold, for CP with One Child and Income of $1000
(See State by State Tables Following for Important Information)
NCP $: Case One: $500 Gross Case Two: $2500 Gross Case Three: $6000 Gross
State Support
Amount
As %
NCP $
CP As %
Poverty
Support
Amount
As %
NCP $
CP As %
Poverty
Support
Amount
As %
NCP $
CP As %
Poverty
Arizona $75 15% 96% $402 16% 125% $690 11.5% 151%
Calif. $47 9% 93% $428 17% 127% $977 16% 176%
Mass. $112 22% 99% $552 22% 138% $1420 24% 216%
N.Y. $78 16% 96% $392 16% 124% $942 16% 173%
Okla. $96 19% 98% $390 16% 124% $710 12% 152%
S.D. $100 20% 98% $419 17% 126% $769 13% 158%
Wisc. $56 11% 94% $425 17% 127% $1020 17% 180%
Notes
The following assumptions or methodological choices were made in producing the
calculations shown in this Table. For further notes specific to an individual state, see the State by
State Tables below.
1. There is one child, and that child is ten years old. (Some states allow adjustments for older
children.)
2. The custodial parent has a gross income of $1,000 per month (as in Table 1 in the text).
3. The child spends 73 days, or 20% of the year, with the non-custodial parent. This
assumption is relevant in those states which make adjustments for this factor.
4. Neither parent pays or receives support for other children.
5. All calculations are based entirely on the parents’ incomes, visitation time (when relevant
under the guideline), and the child’s age (when relevant under the guideline). No extra expenses or
contributions, such as child care or health insurance, were considered. Such expenses would affect
guideline calculations.
6. Numbers were rounded to the nearest whole number.
7. Discretionary self-support or low income allowances were not applied. See the individual
state by state tables for further information on the impact of this decision in each state.
8. The poverty threshold employed for all poverty calculations is the poverty threshold
provided by the United States Census Bureau in Poverty Thresholds for 2005 by Size of Family and
Number of Related Children under 18 Years. This publication is available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/powerty/thrshld/thresh05.html. For a family of two (custodial
parent and child) in which the parent is under 65 years of age and there is one child under the age
of 18, this federal poverty threshold is at $13,461 ($1,121.75 monthly). For one person under the
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age of 65 (non-custodial parent), it is $10,160 ($846.67 monthly).
STATE BY STATE TABLES
Arizona
Case Number NCP
Monthly
Gross
Income
(Before
Support
Payment)
Monthly
Support
Payment
(Under
Arizona
Guideline)
Payment as
% NCP
Income
CP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
NCP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
1 $500 $75* 15% 96% 50%
2 $2500 $402 16% 125% 248%
3 $6000 $690 11.5% 151% 627%
*At this income level, the NCP would be eligible for the discretionary self support reserve
which would reduce the obligation to zero.
As previously indicated, the support amounts shown here assume the obligor visits with the
child a total of 73 days per year. The visitation adjustment applied by Arizona would substantially
greater if the obligor saw the child at least 88 days per year. In that case (and assuming visitation did
not exceed 115 days) the support amounts called for in the guidelines for Cases 1,2 and 3 would be,
respectively,$57, $365, and $633. On the other hand, the guidelines allow the court to increase the
child support award to reflect the obligor’s proportionate share of child care costs “appropriate to
the parents' financial abilities”, and require an increase to reflect the obligor’s share of the cost of
health insurance. Child care and health insurance costs, were they present, would thus yield an
upward adjustment.
Support Amounts Obtained from the Arizona Child Support Guidelines Calculator, Arizona
Supreme Court, http://www.supreme.state.az.us/childsup/pdf/arizsup22.pdf (Last accessed August
3, 2006).
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California
Case Number NCP
Monthly
Gross
Income
(Before
Support
Payment)
Monthly
Support
Payment
(Under
California
Guideline)
Payment as
% NCP
Income
CP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
NCP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
1 $500 $47* 9% 93% 53%
2 $2500 $428 17% 127% 245%
3 $6000 $977 16% 176% 593%
* This amount does not include the discretionary low-income allowance. Obligors earning
less than $1000 in net disposable income are eligible for this allowance, which would reduce the
monthly support payment to $25.
The California child support formula does not use gross income, but rather the “net
disposable incomes” of both parents. California Family Code §4059 specifies that net disposable
income is derived from gross income by deducting actual amounts for several items, including
federal and state income taxes, FICA payroll taxes, compulsory union dues, alimony and court-
ordered child support to other children actually being paid, and health insurance premiums. To
convert from the gross incomes used for the calculations of other states, estimates of state and federal
income taxes, and FICA, were deducted from gross income and the resulting income was employed
in the calculation. Thus, it was assumed there were no deductions for union dues, alimony, support
for other children, or health insurance. The net disposable incomes thus employed for the
calculations, as equivalent to the gross incomes employed in other states, was $1064 for the custodial
parent, and $460, $2035, and $4320 for the noncustodial parent in cases 1 through 3 respectively.
The custodial parent’s net disposable income higher than that parent’s gross income because of the
average impact of the earned income tax credit.
Federal income tax was estimated by multiplying the assumed gross income by average tax
rates actually paid by US taxpayers with similar characteristics. The average tax rates were derived
from an IRS table showing taxes paid and earned income tax credits (EITC) refunded by income
category, marital status and number of children at home. (This table was supplied to the authors by
the Individual Special Projects Section, Statistics of Income Division, Internal Revenue Service as
a special tabulation, prepared June 29, 2006, and derived from the IRS 2003 Statistics of Income
Individual Tax File). The effect of the EITC is included in this calculation, and yields a negative
average tax rate for the lowest income earners with children. California state income tax were
estimated from the state’s tax table, assuming the standard deduction. This assumption overstates
the actual average state taxes paid since some taxpayers, especially those with higher incomes, have
larger deductions. (Source: California Franchise Tax Board 2005 tax table (Form 540 2EZ) at
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http://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/05_forms/05_5402eztt.pdf). FICA was assumed to be 7.65% of gross
income in all cases ( 6.2% for social security and 1.45% for medicare.)
Support amounts were obtained using the California support calculator provided by the Self
Help Law Center, http://www.west.net/%7Eivguy/testcalc.html (Last accessed July 17, 2006).
Massachusetts
Case Number NCP
Monthly
Income
(Before
Support
Payment)
Monthly
Support
Payment
(Under Mass.
Guideline)
Payment as
% NCP
Income
CP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
NCP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
1 $500 $112* 22% 99% 47%
2 $2500 $552 22% 138% 230%
3 $6000 $1420 24% 216% 541%
*Obligor is not eligible for the self support reserve. It is discretionary for those earning less
than $400 per month.
Massachusetts employs an unusual hybrid system, part POOI and part income shares. When
the obligee’s income is less than $20,000 (plus child care costs), Massachusetts applies a progressive
POOI system: the award is a percentage of the obligor’s income, with the percentage increasing as
obligor income rises. For example, if there is one child, the percentage begins at 21%, rises to 23%
for obligor income in excess of $1213 monthly, and then again to 25% for obligor income in excess
of $3250. The amount calculated byapplying these percentages to obligor income is called the “basic
award”. The basic award is reduced if obligee income exceeds a threshold of $20,000 annually
($1667 monthly), plus child care costs. This reduction increases as obligee income rises: the greater
the amount by which obligee income exceeds this threshold, the greater is the reduction in the basic
award. While child care costs are thus a factor in calculating the award–the higher they are, the
higher an income the obligee must have before the basic award is reduced–they are not otherwise
allocated between the parties, as they are in other states, but remain the responsibility of the custodial
parent. Health insurance costs attributable to the child are split evenly between the parents, rather
than in proportion to their incomes. Most uninsured medical costs are allocated on a case by case
basis. Adjustments for visitation are discretionary on a case-by-case basis. When the obligee’s gross
income falls below $5200 annually, the support award is discretionary, but cannot be less than $80
per month. Earned income tax credits are counted as income in these calculations, for both parents.
Support amounts were obtained by using the two official aids: the Calculator Long Form, at
<http://www.cse.state.ma.us/PARENTS/Calc2.htm>, and Table A from Commonwealth of
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Massachusetts, Administrative Office of the Trial Court, Child Support Guidelines at
<http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelines/csg2006.html>. (Last accessed August 2, 2006.)
New York:
Case Number NCP
Monthly
Income
(Before
Support
Payment)
Monthly
Support
Payment
(Under New
York
Guideline)
Payment as
% NCP
Income
CP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
NCP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
1 $500 $78* 16% 96% 50%
2 $2500 $392 16% 124% 249%
3 $6000 $942 16% 173% 597%
*New York allows a self-support reserve of 125% of the poverty level set by the federal
department of Health and Human Services for a single person household. N.Y. Com Rel. Law §
240.1-b(b)(6) (McKinney 2003). This obligor is eligible for that self support reserve, which would
reduce the obligation to zero.
Support amounts were calculated manually, as New York’s system is relativelysimple. When
the parents’ combined annual gross income is less than $80,000, the obligor owes 17% of his or her
adjusted income for one child. **TARA: I ADDED “THE PARENTS’” ASSUMING THAT IS
WHAT WAS MEANT. The adjusted income is defined as gross income less city income taxes,
FICA , compulsory pension deductions, alimony paid and other child support paid. State and federal
income taxes are not deducted. The calculations employed here assumed an adjusted gross income
equal to the gross income minus FICA (which was taken as 7.65% of gross income).
Oklahoma
Case Number NCP
Monthly
Income
(Before
Support
Payment)
Monthly
Support
Payment
(Under
Oklahoma
Guideline)
Payment as
% NCP
Income
CP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
NCP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
1 $500 $96 19% 98% 48%
2 $2500 $390 16% 124% 249%
3 $6000 $710 12% 152% 625%
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Support amounts were obtained by using the Unofficial Online Child Support Guidelines
Calculator made available by the Child Support Enforcement Division of the Oklahoma Department
of Human Services, at http://www.okdhs.org/childsupport/guidelines/calc.htm (Last accessed
August 6, 2006).
South Dakota
Case Number NCP
Monthly
Income
(Before
Support
Payment)
Monthly
Support
Payment
(Under South
Dakota
Guideline)
Payment as
% NCP
Income
CP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
NCP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
1 $500 $100 20% 98% 47%
2 $2500 $419 17% 126% 246%
3 $6000 $769 13% 158% 618%
Support Amounts were obtained using the child support calculator provided by the South
Dakota Department of Social Services, Division of Child Support, posted at
<http://www.state.sd.us/applications/SS17PC02CAL/SupportCalc1.asp> (last accessed August 3,
2006).
Wisconsin
Case Number Monthly
NCP Income
(Before
Support
Payment)
Monthly
Support
Payment
(Under
Wisconsin
Guideline)
Payment as
% NCP
Income
CP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
NCP Income,
After
Payment, as
% of Poverty
1 $500 $56* 11.13% 94% 52%
2 $2500 $425 17% 127% 245%
3 $6000 $1020 17% 180% 588%
*In general, obligors owe 17 percent of gross income for support of one child. However, for
obligors earning betwenn $575 and $950 a different rate schedule applies. (Available at
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/rsb/code/dwd/dwd040_app_c.pdf, last accessed August 3, 2006). Below
$575 gross income, child support amounts are discretionary. The amount for Case 1 was computed
using the minimum rate on the low income schedule (11.13%).
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Child support amounts were obtained using the Child Support Percentage Conversion Table
contained in Appendix A of the Guidelines for Setting Child Support Amounts, Chapter DWD 40,
published by the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development and available at
<http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/dwd/publications/dws/child_support/dwsc_824_p.htm>.
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Appendix B
A Sample from the Literature on the Relationship Between Income and Child Well-Being
By Preethy George and Ira Ellman,
This review does not purport to be a comprehensive and definitive statement of all that social
science can tell us about this topic. It is instead an overview of a reasonably representative sample
of the literature, adequate to provide the reader a window into the potential value, as well as the
limits of, the information available to child support policymakers.
1. The Effect of General Family Income on Child Well-being
During the last two decades, there has been a growing body of research investigating the
associations between family income and children’s development, particularly for low-income
families. The general review of the literature would suggest that poverty is detrimental to children’s
development across all domains of development. The literature consistently finds a relationship
between economic hardship in the family and child outcomes such as diminished cognitive ability,
academic failure, behavioral and psychological disorders, and delinquency(Duncan & Brooks-Gunn,
1997; Luthar, 1999; McLoyd, 1998). Sobolewski and Amato (2005) found that growing up with
economic stress in the family also predicts children’s poor emotional mental health into early
adulthood. While many studies in the psychological literature document the negative effects of
poverty on child well-being, there is variability in the experience that children have within each
income level. Research suggests that income level is not as predictive of child outcomes as are other
indicators that are often associated with income level (i.e., geography, immigration status, parenting
quality, and exposure to adverse life events and stress). We present below an overview of current
literature that examines how income relates to child outcomes and well-being. The studies included
in this section employ child well-being measures that assess major developmental areas of
competence that children are expected to achieve. These variables include assessments of academic
achievement, cognitive development, and psychosocial development.
Sobolewski and Amato (2005) is one of the few studies that attempts to assess the long-term
impact of economic hardship on children, by examining their outcomes as adults. The used the data
collected by Booth et al (1998) in the study of Marital Instability Over the Life Course. A sample
of 2000 married persons were interviewed over the phone in 1980, having being reached by random
digit dialing. Follow up interviews were then conducted at four later times, through 1997, and a
sample of the children of the original interviewees was included in the data collection during the
final two interview waves. Among other variables, the questions provided information on the
parents’ education, their economic resources (in both income and assets), their subjective perception
of whether they were under economic stress, the extent of marital discord, the quality (assessed by
both the parents and the sample of their children) of the parent-child relationship, and measures of
the children’s psychological well-being and their socioeconomic attainment. Their central finding
relevant to our concerns was that perceived economic stress was related to lower levels of
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psychological well-being in the children, while objective indicators of the parents’ economic
resources was related to the children’s socioeconomic status as adults (measured in years of
education and income). One limit in this study’s applicability to child support issues is the authors’
focus on children whose parents remained married through the years of the study. That focus allowed
them to test, and confirm, a model posited by earlier authors that economic stress yields marital
discord, which in turn reduces children’s psychological well-being. Clearly, this model tells us little
about the possible impact of economic stress on children raised in single-parent families.
On the other hand, their data also support a more direct relationship between objective
indicators of economic status in children’s households, and children’s socioeconomic status as
adults. These results do seem equally applicable to children in single-parent families. Moreover, the
authors were able to relate the duration of economic privation to the effect size, by examining
whether, in each of four waves during the child’s minority, the child’s family was in the lowest
quartile in objective economic indicators. They found a monotonic association between the number
of waves in which this was true, and the children’s ultimate educational attainment, with each period
of exposure to economic hardship associated with a reduction in the children’s completed years of
education by one-fourth to one-third of a year. A similar analysis of the parents’ perception of
economic stress, as contrasted with objective indicators of economic hardship, found a similar
relationship between it and the children’s psychological well-being, but no relationship with the
children’s educational attainment.
Other studies do not look at the long-term outcomes for children when they are adults, but
the basic pattern in their results is nonetheless similar to the Sobolewski and Amato study: there are
repeated findings of a relationship between objective economic indicators, and cognitive or
educational measures of children’s outcomes, but less consistent findings of any relationship
between economic indicators and psychosocial measures. Mistry, Biesanz, Taylor, Burchinal, and
Cox (2004) conducted a study using data from an already existing longitudinal data set. Mothers and
children were recruited throughout 1991 from hospitals in or near 10 cities across the U.S. For this
study, 1,363 families were included in the final analyses. Data were collected when the children
were 1 month of age through 36 months of age. Mothers were interviewed regarding family income,
and children’s functioning was assessed during laboratory visits when children were 36 months old.
The study sought to identify the relationship between family income, family processes and child
adjustment. Theyalso sought to find whether the associations between income and child functioning
were linear (i.e., is more always better?) or whether income is more strongly related to child well-
being at certain points of the economic distribution than others. To measure family income, they
used an income-to-needs ratio, which is calculated from maternal interview items collected at 4
different time points. The income-to-needs ratio was computed by dividing family income by the
appropriate poverty threshold for each household size. An income-to-needs ratio of 1.0 thus
indicates that the family income equals the poverty threshold income for a family of that size and
composition. Such an income-to-needs ratio is a commonly used method for creating a common
metric that allows comparisons of economic status across families of different size and composition.
For 2002, the poverty threshold for a family of four was $18,392, and this family would have an an
income-to-needs ratio of 1. An income to needs ration of 5, for a family of four, was $91,960. In this
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sample, income-to-needs ratios ranged from 0.16 to 22.47. To measure family processes, the
researchers examined mothers’ level of depression and the mother’s relationship with the child.
Researchers measured child cognitive and language development at 36 months using the School
Readiness subtest of the Bracken Scale of Basic Concepts (Bracken, 1984). Readiness measures
knowledge of color, letter identification, number/counting, comparisons and shape retention.
Language development was measured using the Reynell Developmental Language Scales (Reynell,
1991), which assessed verbal comprehension and expressive language. Theyalso examined maternal
reports of child behavior problems and maternal reports of child social competence. Family financial
resources were also based upon maternal reports. One caution is that such reliance may introduce
unreliability in the measures. A study employing independent observers of both family process
measures and child outcomes would avoid this chance of reporter bias.
In sum, Mistry, et al. found that after controlling for family process variables, children’s
cognitive-linguistic development was the onlyvariable strongly related to the income-to-needs ratio.
The other psycho-social measures (social competence and problem behavior) were not directly
affected by income. Changes in income has a larger impact on cognitive-linguistic development at
lower income levels. For children in households with income-to-needs ratios below 5, the effect on
cognitive-linguistic development was especially strong. At ratios greater than 5, the relationship
begins to diminish toward zero. While there was a relationship between income and measures of
child social competence and behavior problems, that relationship was was fully mediated by
maternal mental health and maternal-child relationships. In contrast, the relationship between income
and cognitive-linguistic outcomes for children could not be fullyexplained bymaternal mental health
and parent-child relationships.
In a similar study, Dearing, McCartney, and Taylor (2001) examined associations between
the change in income-to-needs and child outcomes (school readiness, receptive language, expressive
language, positive social behavior, and behavior problems). Their sample consisted of 1216 families
using longitudinal data from the NICHD Study of Early Child Care. Families with an income-to-
needs ratio greater than or equal to 1 during all the time assessments were coded as not poor, and
those with an income-to-needs ratio of less than 1 were coded as poor. Children from poor families
had significantly lower levels of functioning across all indicators of child well being than did
children in families classified as not poor, even after controlling for child gender, ethnicity, birth
weight, mother’s education, and changes in family structure. These results are consistent with other
findings that income effects are strongest at the low end of the income distribution. This study’s
design, classifying all families as poor or not poor, makes it impossible to identify the income level
at which additional dollars have diminishing returns.
Morris and Gennetian (2003) used data from the Minnesota Family Investment Program,
designed to promote participation in work related activities for long-term welfare recipients and to
provide a financial benefit to families to supplement their earnings through the welfare system. Their
study examined the association between income, and children’s achievement and behavioral
outcomes, as well as the effects on children of increased parental employment. Measured income
included earnings, food stamps, and welfare benefits. Mothers were asked to rate their children on
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several indicators, including academic achievement, engagement in school, problem behavior, and
positive behavior. The relationship between income, school engagement and positive social behavior
was in the expected direction but were not statistically significant.
Using data from the National Longitudinal Surveyof Youth’s Mother and Child Supplement,
Dooley & Stewart (2004) examined whether income, or other factors related to the family, were
stronger predictors of cognitive outcomes for children over time. They measured cognitive ability
using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) for children ages 4-6, and the Canadian
Achievement Tests (CAT/2). They found that at lower income levels, average income was
significantly related to math and reading abilities. The effect of income on cognitive outcomes
leveled off at $60,000 per year. Controlling for other variables, such as receipt of welfare funds,
adoption status, number of siblings, and housing quality, reduced but did not eliminate the
relationship. They conclude that income has a small but positive effect for low-income children’s
cognitive outcomes.
Blau (1998) examined the effect of parental income on children’s cognitive, social and
emotional development, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The
PIAT Reading and Math, PPVT verbal ability measure, and the Verbal Memory Parts A and B
(measuring short-tem memory) were used to assess cognitive outcomes, and a behavioral measure
was included to gauge child behavior problems. The effect of current income on child cognitive
development was in the expected direction, but it was small and not statistically significant. The
behavior problem index showed a larger income effect. Linver, Brooks-Gunn and Kohen (2002)
examined a sample of 493 White and African American children, ages 3-5. They found a statistically
significant relationship between income and children’s scores on the Stanford-Binet Intelligence
Scale and the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence. Every $10,000 increase in
income was associated with about half a point increase on these measures of cognitive ability.
However, they also and found that a stimulating home environment explained part of this
relationship. If raising income did not also improve the stimulation in the home environment, gains
would be less. Two of these researchers found similar results in another study on the relationship
between income and measures of intellectual achievement (Yeung, Linver, & Brooks-Gunn, 2002).
Economic hardship may have differential effects for children’s well-being depending on the
persistence of financial loss. Though some families experience extended periods of financial
difficulty, others experience temporary loss. Studies have found that persistent financial hardship
has a greater effect on child outcomes than intermittent difficulty (Duncan, Brooks-Gunn, &
Klebanov, 1994). Another factor that is important to consider is the age of the child. When
examining academic indicators of functioning, the effects of low family income are larger for
preschool aged children than adolescents. (Ackerman, Brown, & Izard, 2004).
2. Does Child Support Have an Impact on Child Well-Being Distinct from Income in General?
Some studies suggest that child support has a distinct impact on children’s outcomes, beyond
the effect of income in general. While these studies face serious methodological challenges as a
result of heterogeneity, they do suggest a distinct impact of child support payments.
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A. Cognitive Measurements
Child support was found to be positively related to children’s school achievement in a study
by McLanahan, Seltzer, Hanson, and Thomson (1991). Their subjects were 844 mothers of children
under 18, in which at least one child had a living nonresident father, who had answered survey
questions in the National Survey of Families and Household (NSFH). These mothers were asked
“What sort of grades does your child get?”. Responses were limited to “mostly A’s,” “mostly A’s
and B’s,” “mostly B’s, ”“mostly B’s and C’s,” etc., and were coded from 0 to 4 to reflect likely GPA.
The more child support received, the higher the reported grades. Moreover, child support dollars
wree associated with larger increases in GPA than dollars from other sources: Each thousand dollars
of other income was associated with an increase in GPA of less than 0.0005 points, whereas $1,000
of child support was associated with increase in GPA of 0.011 points. The difference was statistically
significant.
A study by Virginia Knox and Mary Jo Bane used a sample of children in the 1987 Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) who were between ages 2 and 8 in 1968, the first year of the
study. They looked at children in families in which their mother was head of the household for at
least one year while the children were between 8 and 18. They had family income data, including
income sources, for these 11 years, as well as the number of grades the children completed by age
21. They found .1 increase in years of education for each $1,000 increase in child support, a
considerably larger effect than from any other income source. They conclude that child support has
a greater positive impact on the educational attainment of children of single mothers than does
income from welfare or maternal employment.
Yoshikawa (1999) used a sample from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
that included children aged 6-8, and their mothers, who were eligible for welfare and who were
single parents for at least 1 year during the study. They related the number of years that children
received child support payments to their scores on two reading subtests from the Peabody Individual
Achievement Test (PIAT), and the PIAT Math measure. Years of child support was significantly
associated with the children’s reading and math scores. The effects were generally small but
consistent. Similar results were found by King (1994), who looked at the relationship of both father
visitation, and payment of child support, with scores on both the PIAT Math Assessment and the
PIAT Reading Recognition assessment, as well as child self-esteem and scholastic competence in
school. Child support payments were positively related to PIAT scores and scholastic achievement,
while the mother’s overall household income was positively related only to children’s math
achievement. Again, the effect size was small even though statistically significant.
A meta-analysis by Amato and Gilbreth (1999), of 63 studies of non-resident fathers and
child well being, found children’s academic success positively related to fathers’ payment of child
support.
B. Behavioral and Psycho-Social Measurements
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McClanahan et al.(1991) also examined the relationship of child support with school
problems, measured by the mother’s report that the child had dropped out of school (coded as 1), that
the parent had been asked to meet with a teacher or principal because of behavioral problems during
the past year (coded as 2), or, that the child had ever been suspended or expelled from school (coded
as 3). Additional child support payments were associated with fewer school problems, and the effect
size was larger than for income from other sources. A thousand dollars of ordinary income was
associated with reductions in school problems by 0.003 among children born to married parents and
0.021 among children born to unmarried parents. An increase of $1,000 in child support was
associated with reductions of 0.053 and 0.144 for children born to married and unmarried parents
respectively. However, a study by Antecol and Bedard (2004) found a greater incidence of smoking,
sexual activity, and criminal convictions among youth who received child support but rarely saw
their biological father, than in the other three groups they observed (youth who often saw their father
and received child support; youth who often saw their father, but did not receive child support; and
youth who rarely saw their father and did not receive child support.) They suggest two possible
explanations for this result: fathers with already deviant youth may be compelled to pay support but
less willing to see them, than fathers with less deviant children, or that children whose fathers pay
but do not visit see their fathers as particularly uncaring, because it is clear they know where their
children are but nonetheless do not see them.
C. The Heterogeneity Problem
It is axiomatic that correlational data cannot establish causal connections. The difficulty of
discerning causal relationships is worse when multiple factors, themselves related to one another,
are present, and could plausibly have a causal role. That is the case in most of these studies. The
intensity and quality of parental involvement with the child, parental conflict, and socioeconomic
circumstances all might plausiblyaffect a child’s adjustment to divorce and single parenthood (Lamb
2002), and are all related to one another. The complexity of the analysis is increased if, as seems the
case here, any associations could be bi-directional. For example, not only may increased child
support foster visitation, and thereby enhance child adjustment, but adequate contact may also
strengthen a nonresident father’s sense of involvement, and thereby increase his willingness to make
child support payments, which in turn may all affect child well-being. It is therefore difficult to know
whether these studies are measuring something other than child support itself. Fathers who may have
more education and higher incomes may be more likely to pay child support than other fathers, and
their children may be more likely to do well in school. Fathers who pay child support may care more
about their children and may be more involved with their children in other unobserved ways (Argys,
et al. 1998 at 161). Payments could be correlated with some other unmeasured the family
characteristic such as fathers’ commitment to the child, mother’s determination to make the father
pay, or parent’s ability to cooperate in raising the child. Therefore, the child support coefficient may
be capturing the effects of these unmeasured variables as well as the effects of child support dollars.
Knox and Bane sought to deal with heterogeneity by controlling for the father’s education
and for whether he paid any support at all. They found that neither variable reduced the effect size
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of child support payments or its statistical significance (Knox and Bane at 302). Indeed, they found
no effect at all of the father’s education on their children’s educational attainment, a result at odds
with findings in other studies. Argys et. al, controlled for family income and other socioeconomic
family-background characteristics, and found that child support receipt still had additional positive
effects on children’s math (PIAT) and verbal (PPVT) score.
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